A Historical Reason for China’s High Rate of Execution?

If China executes so many people, one key question is why? More specifically, what moral and legal reasoning might cause the state to accept the death penalty in so many criminal cases? Their might also be a secondary question as to why the Chinese state seems to be ethically unconcerned about the use of the organs of those executed by the state within the growing organ transplant business.

Leaving the second question aside for now, are there historical reasons why it seems to be more acceptable in China than in the West today to carry out the death penalty? Can we identify a historical trend of the use of the death penalty in China? The answer to this question is yes. Historically, use of corporal and capital punishment in China has been common. In the Ming Dynasty, which began in 1368, one key means of reducing government corruption was the public execution of officials caught in corruption. A common means of carrying out this particular death penalty was what is often know and the “death of a thousand cuts,” or “death by slow slicing.” A corrupt official would be brought to a public place and subjected to numerous small cuts, eventually bleeding to death in the midst of torture. The public nature of this horrific penalty was an important part of the ritual. Like the Chinese government today, the purpose of this kind of execution was preventive. The Ming hoped that those in positions to become corrupt might see the horror of the death, and the shame that fell upon the family in such a public way. This would lead to recognition of the potential outcome of corruption, and prevent others from taking the same path.

During the Qin Dynasty, from 221 BCE to 206 CE, the central political philosophy was Legalism. Developed by Confucian scholars who came to disagree with the founder of their discipline about the nature of human kind. Thinkers like Li Si and Han Fei came to see human nature as basically self-serving. Since humans, they thought, could not just be taught what was right and expected to behave well, they developed a system in which a strong ruler created strong laws. For them, it was unimportant what moral or logical basis the laws had. It was only important that the ruler had the right to create the law through the ability to enforce it. Obedience to such laws would be enforced through strict punishments that were often capital in nature. Once again, then, the use of capital punishment was not simply for punishment of wrongdoing. It was used to warn others not to commit the same or similar acts of disobedience. The question of whether the person punished deserved the punishment administered was less important than that others know of the brutality of the punishment and avoid the situation in which it might be administered.

Do laws and attitudes like this make China any more likely to accept the death penalty in large numbers today than other states in the world? Probably not. Capital punishment has probably been used in most societies. In Europe, now the globe’s most vocal supporter of abolishing the death penalty for any crime, capital punishment has a long and storied history. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it was common to execute religious prisoners by burning them alive, often on the flimsiest of evidence that a crime had even been committed. At various stages in European history hanging, drawing and quartering, and other horrific punishments were applied to numerous crimes. In cases where members of a community were found to be in rebellion against the community or to have acted magically against other members of the community, their friends, neighbors, and strangers were often invited to participate in administering public violence that led to their deaths. These executions were at the time sanctioned by the religious and secular authorities, and appear to have been used often primarily for punishment, with a justice system that was often so inconsistent that torture and death provided little in the way of guidance for others about what behavior to avoid in order to survive. So China has no lock on the historical use of the death penalty or torture.

More recently, the Communist Party took control of China in 1949 in part on the premise that crime was inexcusable in a socialist society. Mao and his contemporaries put significant resources into a brutal repression of crime during their consolidation of control in China after 1949. Crime rates in every area from theft to violent crime to drug dealing dropped drastically. In large part, credit for this is given to the brutality of Communist anti-crime initiatives. Judgment was swift, and punishment was not infrequently capital in nature. The success of this policy may have left a deep impression in China even up to today. Deng Xaoping refused, even after the discrediting of Mao’s policies that came after his death, to consider getting rid of the death penalty. In a way, the Chinese state may continue to see this policy in a kind of “if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it,” sense. Of course, in China today the Communist Party of China retains only a precarious hold on power an increasingly capitalist society. Through a kind of pragmatic social contract, the Communist Party retains legitimacy through the practical success of its policies. As long as China’s economy is getting better, and Chinese citizens have increasing opportunities to benefit economically, the Communist Party can maintain power with little problem. A part of this is its success in reducing the crime rate. Another part is finding ways to silence those who no longer accept this deal as practical or desirable. In other words, probably since the rise of Deng in 1976, the death penalty in China provides a means of holding power that goes beyond the primarily preventive role that it has historically held in that society.

A Method for Calculating China’s Death Penalty Statistics

There are twenty two nations in the world today that execute criminals. According to Amnesty International,the highest per-capita number of executions each year take place in Iran and Singapore. The highest actual number of executions take place in China. Because the number of executions it carries out is classified by China as a state secret, Amnesty International says that accurate data on executions is too hard to obtain to make even an educated guess. It therefore leaves China out of its annual report on death penalty statistics except for the claim of high numbers of executions there.

However, estimates regarding China’s execution numbers do exist. Understanding how these estimates are created is important in assessing their accuracy. Since China’s policy is to keep their totals a state secret, clearly the methods for calculating inmate executions must reach that data indirectly. One method has been to estimate death row executions by using the number of organ transplants carried out in China. A description of one way of thinking through this method is available online at www.stoporganharvesting.org. Despite its use by an organization with a clear political agenda,the method is worth a look.

Stop Organ Harvesting does not claim that their method gives an exact estimate of executions in the Chinese justice system. Rather, they claim that by using claims of execution numbers, the percentage of possible organ donors, and the number of potential organ donations. Using this method, they have evaluated estimates that between 1999 and 2002 an average of about 10,000 executions occurred in China, and found them to be consistent with the number of organ transplants performed there.

Given a low growth rate in organ donations from family members of the receiving patient, and the absence of a national organ donation network, the only way to account for the total number of organ transplant carried out in those years is to include the number of potential organ donations from death row inmates.

The article is here. There is some lack of sophistication in the estimate. The variables involved in calculating the number of potential donors would not likely be as simple as Stop Organ Harvesting assumes in their formula. For one thing, it may be statistically untrue that the death row prison population reflects the distribution of organ transplant compatibility in the general population. For another, it is possible that a prison population is less healthy that the general population, which could lead to lower-than-average discovery of tissue healthy enough to transplant. However, again with the caveat that this particular organization has a clear political agenda, as corroborating data, the method gives some means to analyze the veracity of claims made by death penalty watchdog groups globally.

 

Yingjin Zhang: *Chinese National Cinema*

Yingjin Zhang, in Chinese National Cinema, provides a useful, and very complete, chronological account of the development of film in the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.  An important subtext of Zhang’s history (he makes it his central goal, but the organization of the book is really that of a chronological history) is the idea that Chinese cinemas do constitute a national cinema, not in the sense of the nation-state, but in the sense of the nation people.  Andrew Jones’ Yellow Music, and Geremie Barmé’s In the Red both operate under similar assumptions.  First, that popular culture is most effective and valuable when it is a de-centralized product of a self-defined group (Zhang’s nation-people).  Second, that when used by the state popular culture is little more than a blunt instrument for propaganda, easily read and ineffective.  And third, that cultural history can be read through the intentions of culture producers and the environment and technology by which they are informed. All three authors address these points while dealing with essentially the same chronological structure, which frames their analysis in nearly every way.

I discovered upon reading the three assigned books for this week:  Andrew Jones’ Yellow Music and Geremie Barmé’s In The Red, that the chronology followed by Zhang is by no means unique among scholars attempting to decode Chinese popular culture in the twentieth century.  In fact, for all the criticism that these three authors heap upon the CCP for its blunt-instrument style use of popular culture to inculcate mass national values in the Chinese people, they seemed to me to be surprisingly willing to follow the political chronology of Chinese history when defining moments of popular culture change within Chinese society.

The fact is that all three accept this chronology and write around it.  Zhang makes it the centerpiece of his history of national film, where Jones actually begins with it, and rotates his whole story around this periodization scheme.  Barmé, trying to be revolutionary himself, tackles only the last piece of it, and makes the assumption that he is dealing with a piece of Chinese time that, by definition, is the end-point, the late-stage, of the very same chronology.

This chronological system of analysis begins with the prewar period, the search for modernity and national unity in a fragmented China threatened from without, and gloriously, though also infuriatingly, diverse within.  The Second World War then occurs, and this necessitates a shift toward nationalism in cultural production.  At the end of the war, the Revolution brings an end to KMT rule, and the People’s Republic of China, born of the nation, attempts to use culture to indoctrinate the masses in national and communist value systems.  Upon the end of the Cultural Revolution, and the death of Mao Zedong, a new opening to the world is engineered by Deng Xaoping, and that includes a freeing of cultural constraints, paving the way for Zhang’s Fifth Generation of filmmakers, and other producers more able, or willing, to buck the system, and less likely to be incarcerated for doing so.

The key to the entire chronological system being used here is the Maoist period from the 1950‘s to 1976, during which all three writers assume what Barmé has called the “Culture as Cudgel” model.[1] This is Barmé’s reference to the period between 1950 and 1978, when to produce culture products was to be required to produce state-sponsored, state-censored films with state-specified symbolism and dialogue.

All three authors implicitly set this period, or the attitudes toward the necessity of turning culture to some social use that characterized it, as the center-stone, and sort of a straw man despite its accuracy, as the fulcrum for their analytical projects.

For Zhang, it is this period that helps him set up the idea of Shanghai provenance and Chinese chronology as the essential features of Chinese national cinema, as opposed to the imposed national-state culture of the CCP.

For Jones, it is the desire of CCP culture worker predecessors such as Nie Er, who see the need to make popular culture have some social utility, some meaning, which sets up the whole discussion of “Yellow Music” – the western-influenced predecessor and erstwhile model for the New Music – as a cultural product.

For Barmé, it is the “Culture as Cudgel” period that makes it possible to imagine a freedom in contemporary Chinese culture that may not exist.  Since contemporary culture producers in China do not have the proverbial ax over the head when it comes to content in their culture products, it is easy to imagine that they are not co-opted by the state, when Barmé believes that in fact it is their co-optation by the state that makes them the artists they are.

Yingjin Zhang begins Chinese National Cinema with a short and useful explanation of his project.  He admits that China is a geographically and culturally diverse place, and takes note of recent approaches to cinema in general, and Chinese cinema specifically, that reject the idea that there is a single ‘national cinema’ history for China.  Zhang wants to compare Chinese cinematic history in all of its centers – Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Taipei, looking for a set of cultural assumptions that show these traditions as Chinese not in the sense of the nation-state, but in the sense of what Zhang calls the “nation-people”.[2]

Concentrating on this cultural view of the nation-people, and thus giving some agency to the producers of Chinese popular culture even during the Cultural Revolution years, Zhang eventually succeeds in making a case for Chinese film as roughly comparable in all of the centers which he addresses.  Zhang’s point that this constitutes a kind of national cinema is not as securely founded.  His regional approach does a fine job of exposing the myths that have obscured the diversity of Chinese cinema in the name of the nation, but is unable to securely fasten them together as a national cinema with all of their differences intact.  Instead, Zhang connects the various cinematic traditions of Shanghai, Taiwan, and Hong Kong to a common set of origins, which, ultimately, seems to make them Chinese in provenance rather than in terms of a nation-people which he never fully defines.

Zhang’s first, and primary focus throughout the book, is the physical process of producing culture – in this case, specifically films – and relating that directly to the system by which audiences (the nation-people, presumably) were induced to view, and become comfortable with, this new form of art/entertainment.

Zhang’s first point, which he returns to quite often in the book, is that the new motion pictures, which premiered in 1896, were early on taken in China as being related to the shadow play in traditional Chinese entertainment culture.[3] The use of this term, according to Zhang, “foregrounds a conscientious effort of the Chinese to treat film as historically related to and conceptually indebted to some kind of Chinese tradition.”[4] In fact, film was placed within a chain of events which saw the shadow play move from China to the West, where film started.[5] Thus, in a sense, Chinese could take credit for the new art form, and so comfort in viewing it.

Still, film debuted primarily, as in the West, not as a fully developed art, but as a curiosity.  The technology for creating was new, venues suited to showing it did not exist, and so had to be improvised, and audiences were unsure what to expect, and whether they had gotten what they paid for.[6]

One of Zhang’s most critical points is that Chinese national film culture originated in Shanghai.  The first production company in China, Yaxia, was formed in Shanghai in 1909.[7] Zhang’s exhibition of Chinese film culture as it develops mostly in Shanghai gives readers a blow-by-blow of the art prior to the war with Japan which secures for Shanghai the title of origin.  Zhang’s narrative makes it clear throughout the book after this point that Shanghai is the place where the majority of pre-war production companies was born and died, where the largest number of theatres existed, and where the greatest box-office results were found.  Shanghai, with its growing middle class, its international character, and trading city status was the birthplace of the cinema that Zhang wants to call Chinese.

Zhang spends the majority of his space from Chapter one on talking about three things in a literal step-by-step history of film in Shanghai, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.  His first step in each part of each chapter is to introduce a new development in the film industry, usually introduced historically by a studio.  The focus of this is always on two things:  production process, and new methods of production, acting, and screenwriting that make up the content of film in each era.

This is the case when Zhang discusses the move of film from curiosity to narrative drama, through the development of the pre-war giant Mingxing studio.  Mingxing used the popular “butterfly” fiction of the day, full of stories of romance, emotion, and complex dramatic elements, all tied together by coincidence, to create narrative stories designed to pull the heartstrings of their audiences.  According to Zhang, when May 4th intellectuals were critical of this form, Mingxing responded by updating their butterfly films with more edifying family themes that still used the elements of butterfly fiction, but gave a more moral, nationally oriented story.[8]

In fact, more than a national thread in the history of film, it is this type of stage-by-stage development of technology, plot elements, and film style that is the story Zhang wants to tell.  The idea of the change from curiosity to narrative form is mirrored in nearly every chapter of the book.  In Chapter 2, Zhang concentrates on connecting his vision of Chinese cinema to the experience of Chinese people in all areas (and specifically tries, rather unsuccessfully, to avoid tying this experience to the re-creation of the Chinese State) just before and during the war period from 1930-1949.  The missing element here is evidence about consumption that might show how Chinese audiences actually responded to the intentions of producers.

Jones follows this kind of analytical model as well, though the fulcrum of his chronology centers where Zhang’s is just beginning – in the early to mid-1930’s, with Japan’s conquest of Manchuria, social tensions, cosmopolitanism, and Chinese nationalism.

Ironically, Jones’ project is much more transnational in aim.  With the confluence of new musical technologies, Western music and Chinese music and musical traditions, Jones argues that in an attempt to be national, Chinese, and modern, New Music in fact became cosmopolitan, transnational, non-Chinese, and modern.[9] Jones is arguing that national history is not adequate to contain culture and the conflict between prewar popular music and the popular music of national utility created by Nie Er.  Instead, there is a need for a process “whereby “national cultures . . . [are] rearticulated within the new global framework” of colonial modernity.”[10] In other words, Jones sees the regional and colonial in the national, whereas Zhang sees the national in the regional.  These complex arguments bring us to a key question about popular culture in general which is worth asking:  where do popular culture modes begin and end?  Is popular culture a sign of increasing globalization, or simply cultural expressions of the national at the global level?

Jones sets this question off by making some important observations about two of his protagonists.  Li Jinhui, “to whom the creation of a hybrid genre of American Jazz, Hollywood film music, and Chinese folk music known in China as “modern songs” . . . is usually credited.”[11] This hybrid music, redolent of colonialism as of Chinese tradition, was eventually rejected by one of Li’s protégés, Nie Er, who wanted to create a form of popular music to inspire national sentiments and to increase awareness among Chinese of their plight within the world and within China.  Nie Er’s music was to be useful, and he thus tried to set it off against that of Li Jinhui, claiming both musically and in articles that were critical specifically of Li Jinhui’s style of modern music, its decadence and lack of social utility.  Yet, Jones notes that Nie Er and his fellow critics shared much with Li Jinhui musically.  In early leftist film scores, some of the simplest critiques of Li’s music were done by putting leftist words to Li’s own music.[12]

Nie Er himself was heavily influenced by what Jones calls phonographic realism – a rejection of the subjective techniques of Li’s mixed origin, emotionally driven songs performed by sing-song girls, with the explicit intent to be objective and scientific in representing the world through music.  The idea comes from Marxist cultural criticism, and was expounded, Jones says by the Creation Society, a group of leftist activists who shared Nie Er’s desires here.  A phonograph, it was said, did not observe the world from a particular perspective, hearing only what it wanted to hear.  A phonograph was objective, and to attempt to write music like a phonograph, hearing and creating an objective recording of the conditions of the world, was Nie Er’s and the Creation Society’s objective.[13] To be like the technology of recording, mechanistically to capture the world and present it to the nation-people, to borrow a term from Zhang, was to make oneself useful as a composer.

Ironically, Nie Er’s music drew on the same traditions, the same multi-cultural mix, as that of his teacher, Li Jinhui.  In making music useful and modern, Nie Er did not succeed in making it Chinese.

For Zhang in regards to film, as for Jones when it comes to music the point is that nationalist film was an increasingly popular product for directors and studios – particularly those in Shanghai, who were isolated in the International Settlement when Japan occupied Chinese Shanghai in 1937.  The same was true for ‘nationalist’ new music such as that created by Nie Er.  The 1930’s and 1940’s were a period of reaffirmation of Chinese identity, and the desire was not to broaden or contest what it meant to be Chinese, but to unify and solidify Chinese culture as a monolithic defense against conquest.

According to Zhang, the growing concern about Japanese control of Manchuria after 1932, and the war with Japan after 1937, engendered two major reactions.  These reactions coincide with the political/military realities of China at the time, though not with the geography of that political split.  Shanghai film-makers existed in a world where it was possible to collaborate with the Japanese, become both nationalist and leftist, or follow a line that encouraged a Chinese sense of nation without leftist ideology.  There were, according to Zhang, many films that were in between these extremes, and though censorship existed in all areas of China, many films were able to tread the fine line of censorship while expressing their messages in one or more of the above ideological camps.

Zhang characterizes this period as one of possibility, dynamism, and real subjective agency by film producers and directors.  Films explored, according to Zhang, “ideological struggles between the Nationalists and the leftists, between heroic glorification and humanistic exploration, between social realism and aesthetic modernism.”[14]

The possibility and freedom of expression that Zhang explores in the pre-war period is portrayed as having so much energy and creating such competition between studios that despite the existence of censors and a need to make profit or find financing, studios produced a plethora of films in art and popular genres.  Zhang’s discussion of this era almost seems like the foreshadowing of a communist straw man film industry after the revolution, which Zhang can then knock down later when he discusses the post-Cultural Revolution period.  This turns out to be exactly the case, but not until after Zhang takes a brief interlude to discuss Hong Kong and Taiwan and their relationship to Shanghai film during and before the war.

Zhang gives a critical foreshadowing of his most important contribution in this book in Chapter 4, “Cinematic Reinvention of the National in Taiwan, 1896-1978.”  Here Zhang makes the first point that, “Taiwan did not have a film production history of its own until the 1950’s.”[15] The chronology that Zhang has constructed in this book, with the goal of showing the culture of film as a part of national culture, is one that involves the development of China from one China through the war to multiple Chinas.

Consistent with this theme, this chapter on Taiwan cinema really gets going only when it begins to discuss the postwar transition.  Taiwan’s experience of Japanese rule prior to the war, then KMT rule, and finally, as the site of KMT power and political propaganda made this a particularly difficult place for a film culture to set down roots.  When Japanese films were banned in the postwar, the Taiwan reaction, according to Zhang, was to dust off old Chinese silent films (probably mostly produced in Shanghai) and import “over 100 Shanghai films. . .”[16] This direct connection to Shanghai is the source of the Chinese national in Taiwan film, as far as Zhang is concerned.  This provides the roots, and the experience of war, and particularly post-war and post-revolutionary trauma, martial law, and KMT propaganda, define the Taiwan film industry in its early incarnation.

The separation from mainland film culture comes in the early 1950’s with the emergence and popularity of Taiwanese dialect films.  These films emphasized the differentiation of Taiwan from the Chinese mainland, and catered to audiences who were becoming middle class and economically successful.  They also dealt with the social difficulties of becoming a modern, capitalist, urban state.

According to Zhang, the separation from mainland China was incomplete, caused insecurity, especially among displaced mainlanders, and this provided a market for Mandarin cinema, as well.  Zhang’s take is that the very cosmopolitan nature of Taiwan’s film market is evidence that Taiwan is a part of Chinese cinema history, apparently because it makes it clear that whatever the reactions, Taiwan is dealing with the same chronology as the other “Chinas” he is writing about.

In the same way, Zhang places Hong Kong within the chronology of Chinese cultural development, and connects Hong Kong film to roots in Shanghai cinema.  Since these connections are the only really stable ones, they are the bearers of his national standard.  In Chapter 5 he connects Hong Kong cinema to the pre-war Shanghai experience by claiming that so many Shanghai film-makers moved to Hong Kong during and after the revolution that Hong Kong underwent a cultural Shanghainization.  Major film companies that had had Hong Kong branches relocated production there, and others started it in the confines of the British colony in response to the arrival of the Chinese film industry.

Zhang maintains that the ideological battle between the KMT and the CCP were continued in Hong Kong Mandarin cinema, with left-leaning and bourgeois, market-oriented directors producing films about the nation as a whole, often ”in the tradition of postwar Shanghai realism.”[17] The shadow of Shanghai, and thus mainland China, as the arbiter of Chinese art and national identity, looms large here.  The development of Cantonese cinema in Hong Kong wins world-wide popularity and is diverse and well-produced.  Still, despite the linguistic victory of Cantonese in Hong Kong film, the local nature of these films is, according to Zhang, eventually subsumed back into a mainstream of Chinese film culture.

Jones, too, sees the creation of a new vocabulary of Chinese nationalism in music not simply as a replacement of pre-revolutionary idioms with new nationalist-socialist terms, but as an absorption and regurgitation of those idioms within the new cultural context.  The critical point, of course, is that Jones sees the chronology of these events in the same terms as Zhang.  Thus Jones’ story about the transformations of a song in the movie New Year’s Coin sees the possibility of salvation for the sing-song girls who have come to symbolize the decadence of Li Jinhui’s modern songs and the culture to which they are categorized as belonging.  The sing-song girl can become a part of society, but only by giving up her decadent ways and becoming a part of the collective.[18] Nie Er and others used Li Jinhui’s formula for popular songs to create a new nationalist song that reflexively attempted to negate its own roots.

A key theme in the Zhang and Jones books, whose chronology is taken up by Barmé, is the assumption that the popular culture in China comes from pre-war Shanghai.  This “sprouts of popular culture” idea is what informs Zhang’s idea of the Chinese national in cinema, and creates the Chinese colonial cosmopolitan in Jones’ understanding of Li Jinhui’s “Yellow Music”.

To a great extent, the evidence they share seems to bear them out.  Shanghai’s cosmopolitan nature, large population, and economic importance made it the popular culture capital of Republican-era China.  As Zhang notes, here was where the first movie studio came into existence in China.  Jones makes it clear that Li Jinhui’s broad popularity really began to soar when he and his troop came under the umbrella of the popular and market-oriented Lianhua movie studio in Shanghai.[19]

Further evidence that both Zhang and Jones see Shanghai as the source for Chinese popular culture comes in the discussions of competition which occur primarily in Shanghai.  Zhang discusses the cutthroat competition of movie studios, and then of theater chains, in Shanghai, as a driving force in the production decisions of the industry, dictating what kind of films would be made, what niche each company would fit itself into, and ultimately the survival of producers themselves.[20]

Finally, though, for both Zhang and Jones, the Second World War creates a difficult period for culture producers, most of whom felt some need to express themselves in support of national goals of defense.  These expressions, though, were often of varying ideological quality, with artists on the left, and others on the right, and frequent interchange between them.

The war, however, also forced many producers of popular culture to either live with Japanese occupation in Shanghai, or find a new place where production of culture without Japanese influence or interference was possible.  The dearth of such places, and of consumers for their products, led to a period of drought which many production companies did not survive.[21]

Following the war was the revolution period, and this also created shake-ups in the industry.  The growth of films produced by the CCP, the bald use by the CCP of popular culture to create national and collective consciousness (the “Culture Cudgel” of Barmé referred to earlier) as well as anti-communist propaganda in song and film, KMT training films and documentaries in pre-1949 China, and in Taiwan after 1949.  Zhang wants to argue that the Communist victory makes Taiwan and Hong Kong as much a part of the Chinese nation-people as are those in the PRC, because of the fact that, although their experiences were different, they were reacting to the same post-revolutionary changes.  Thus Zhang’s concentration on Taiwanese Mandarin cinema in Chapter 4, and on Hong Kong Cantonese cinema as an outgrowth of Shanghainization in Chapter 5.[22]

Jones is interested in this part of the chronology of Chinese popular culture, as well.  It is in the post-revolution era when the reactionary music of Nie Er, his foil for Li Jinhui, comes into its own as pragmatic music of the Chinese Communist nation-state, in the service of the people through educating them about their essential and objective collective unity.[23]

It seems clear then that for Zhang and Jones, who have worked together closely, the chronology of the development of Chinese popular culture follows a clear pattern that reflects the chronology of Chinese political developments.  The fulcrum for both books is the Maoist era of 1950-1978, during which subjective, individual expression was not only unacceptable, but not allowed by the state.  On either side of this era, there is a period of possibility and amazing cultural production – a real counter-culture, as Barmé defines it – not as a binary opposite to the dominate or state-sponsored culture, but as a series of graded alternatives to the blunt simplicity and repetitive nature of state-centered symbols and narratives.  This fulcrum period, which is, in effect, a popular culture wasteland in the minds of these two writers, provides a sort of steeping period during which lack of expressive opportunity allows Chinese producers of popular culture to store their collective productive energy for the more freely expressive time to come in the post-Mao period.  It is here that the work of Geremie Barmé becomes most relevant.

Barmé, in his introduction, paints himself as a dissenter when it comes to popular culture analysis.  He gives a long description of his education in China to establish his credentials, he spends time on eschewing recent scholarly trends toward theorizing in analyses of popular culture, while keeping himself in the game by not espousing a ‘just the facts’ approach for which he could be easily criticized.  In fact, Barmé seems to define himself as a researcher and his argument about popular culture primarily in the negative.

In any case, after making his remark about the blunt brutality of cultural suppression in the Maoist period, Barmé goes on to say that, contrary to popular belief, Chinese artists and culture producers are not any more free today than they were then.  In fact, he says, “[after] decades of rule by Proledic [the dictatorship of the proletariat], external political coercion and the internal pressures of the Chinese deep structure meld to create a new self-censoring cultural figure, the state artist. . .”[24]

In Barmé’s view, the new artists of the post-Mao period are not really any more free, they simply are better able to negotiate with the state a position of acceptance of the social contract which allows them some room to criticize society.  The true art, according to these people, says Barmé, is in the ability to “write between the lines” and create culture products that can be passed into production by the state, but also contain critique of that state in subtle ways, coded into the writing in such a way that it is recognizable, but not clear or obvious.[25]

For Barmé, though, this new art of subtle critique, as well as the more overt critiques of Communist Party Rule that have appeared in the recent past are not a sign of a new freedom.  They are instead relatively meaningless, barbs directed at officials, the state of society, or, ironically, and the media itself, but produce no action, and no material change.[26]

Conversely, the market itself, thought of in the West and by many Chinese as the agent of change in the possibility of self-expression, is frequently seen as corrupt by its participants, both producers and consumers alike, for the very reason that it is the market.  This comes clear in the story of author Yu Jie’s book Fire and Ice, rushed to press in the ironic moment of celebration of the importance of Beijing University just as one of its most prominent students, Wang Dan, was being ejected from China for taking its tradition of free speech and criticism too seriously in 1989.  Yu’s critique of the Maoist period and of critics of the new cultural and market freedom was barbed and direct, but appeared to many of its readers as redolent of the market pandering that was the target of the very people the book aimed at.[27]

For Barmé, then, Chinese contemporary popular culture is a circular argument that adjusts itself to the prevailing political winds for market purposes, but achieves nothing important through its cultural criticism in what is a kind of ultimate betrayal of the objectives of Lu Xun.

My key point here is that, writing about the post-Mao period as he is, Barmé does not call into question the chronology used by Zhang and Jones, but works with it, simply correcting the view that the era after the fulcrum period is really an indicator of a return to subjectivity or agency.  The fundamental structure of equating the popular culture chronology to the chronology of China’s modern political history remains unchanged.

Still, Barmé does add something new to the mix in the post-Mao period – a sense that popular culture is not linked to political or social change at all, except, because of the market, as a reflector – a mirror that inadequately expresses the opinions of the masses as contrary to, but not necessarily any better than, those of the holders of power in China.  Worse, because the producers, and especially the consumers of Chinese popular culture are essentially subalterns themselves, popular culture functions as a way to provide the masses with a voice with little risk, because as shrill as it may be, this voice can say nothing.  To twist a phrase from Spivak, the subaltern can speak, but it has no impact.

This brings several questions to mind.  First, does the production of culture really fit the political periodization so neatly?  If so, do the politics drive the culture, or does the culture, as Jones wants to think, provide us with the understanding of our time, which we therefore create in line with our understanding?  In other words, is political culture the real driver of historical change?  Another key question might be, is it possible to write a chronological history in terms of the production of culture, rather than the events of politics?

Finally, one primary missing piece to all three of these analyses is any clear sense of what consumers thought as they participated in re-producing these cultural artifacts, be they songs, movies, novels, etc., during each of the periods discussed.  This is, of course, a tall order, especially, as Jones mentions, because of the relative difficulty of finding sources created by the producers themselves.  The chances of finding evidence about how consumers – common Chinese from various classes, locations, etc., viewed these products as they were using them would be very hard to find indeed, especially from the pre-war period.

However, as Stuart Hall and John Storey have pointed out, and Jones has mentioned, the culture production system is a two-way street.  Producers may have intent for the use of their products, and their meaning, at the time of production.  Consumers, however, use products, even cultural products, for their own purposes.  Even if it were possible for Nie Er to create an objective musical recording, the consumers of that recording would all use it in subjective ways.

Zhang gets close to this analysis – maybe as close as can be for the pre-war period – when he shows statistics of theater attendance, quotes from movie magazines and theater advertisements, etc.  Still, these statistics are only slightly useful, and don’t give a complex story about individual consumption habits.  The movie magazines are highly mediated, themselves selling to their audience ideas that they think people want to hear, but cannot be sure of, and they were mostly the products of the moving production companies.

The closest to this kind of analysis is Barmé, but his book reveals him as a participant in the wars over popular culture – one of the many voice-ful, but ultimately perhaps meaningless subalterns – in the debate.  He has access to much of the evidence on consumption, and uses it to fire potshots at his critics rather than to make a critical reading that is really useful. Still, Barmé’s approach is useful.
Bibliography

Barmé, Geremie. In The Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

Jones, Andrew F. Yellow Music: Media Culture and Colonial Modernity in the Chinese Jazz Age. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001.

Zhang, Yingjin. Chinese National Cinema. New York: Routledge, 2004.


[1] Geremie Barmé, In The Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 1.

[2] Yingjin Zhang, Chinese National Cinema (New York, Oxon: Routledge, 2004; reprint, NY, NY: Routledge, 2005), 5-6 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

[3] Ibid., 13-15.

[4] Ibid., 15.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., 17-20.

[7] Ibid., 19.

[8] Ibid., 22-28.

[9] Andrew F. Jones, Yellow Music: Media Culture and Colonial Modernity in the Chinese Jazz Age (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001), 7-20.

[10] Ibid., 10.  Here Jones is himself quoting from Wang Yuhe.

[11] Ibid., 6.

[12] Ibid., 113.

[13] Ibid., 108.

[14] Zhang, 59.

[15] Ibid., 113.

[16] Ibid., 121.

[17] Ibid., 159

[18] Jones, 130-133.

[19] Ibid., 97.

[20] Zhang, 58-81.

[21] Zhang, 83-95.

[22] Zhang, 113-185.

[23] Jones, 133.

[24] Barmé, 2.

[25] Ibid., 6.

[26] Barmé, 147-149.

[27] Ibid., 350-353.

Karl: *Staging the World* synopsis

In Staging the World Rebecca Karl argues that contemporary approaches to the study of nationalism are too narrow.  Benedict Anderson sees nationalism as defined by the state even as it defines the state, and analyzes nationalism’s development primarily as an internal politico-cultural process.  Prasenjit Duara, Karl says, goes just he opposite direction and uses local history to oppose the idea that nationalism exists in any way but the contrived narrative produced by a governing body trying to define and legitimate its control over geographically, culturally, and economically disparate areas.  Rather than these narrow approaches, Karl argues that Chinese nationalism at its inception was a complex set of intellectual conceptions not circumscribed by the existence or position of the Chinese state, nor defined by processes within China alone.  Instead, Karl posits the possibility that Chinese intellectuals perceived China as a national entity by way of a growing sense that China was a part of the world, and that there were certain analogues for China’s problems in other places in the world from which the Chinese could learn and by which China could be reimagined as a modern state.  This sense of China in the world Karl calls “globality’, and it is her position that China discovered itself by creating histories of other places within the colonized world (Turkey, Japan, Hawaii, South Africa and the Philippines, among others) that served as tropes for thinking of China’s problems, opportunities, and identity in the intellectual world of 1898-1911.

Weston: *The Power of Position* Synopsis

Weston, Timothy B.  The Power of Position:  Beijing University, intellectuals, and Chinese Political Culture, 1898-1929. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2004.

In The Power of Position, Weston contends that during the Republic the founding and growth of Beijing University as an intellectual center for China created the mouthpiece for Chinese intellectuals to make a case for themselves as the proper leadership for China in the modern era.  After making this point in his introduction, the second and third chapters discuss the founding of Beijing University in the end of the Qing Dynasty as the Jingshi daxuetang and then follow the University through China’s 1911 revolution and its aftermath in Beijing.  Weston’s primary goal in the fourth chapter is to show the University’s ability to position itself as new, but the inheritor of the intellectual tradition in China. In the fifth, titled “The Insistent Pull of Politics” he asserts that intellectuals saw themselves as the proper leaders of society, in the Confucian style, and sought to use Beijing University as their mouthpiece and as a place to train their students to think in terms of service to the larger nation of China.  In chapter six, Weston sees this process of moving from Imperial University to “Beida”, the modern hotbed of intellectual discovery and political activism, as having reached its peak in the May 4th Movement of 1919.  Chapter seven discusses a crossroads after the 1920’s during which the University seemed to be trying to choose between political activism and academic professionalism, where the problems of modern society could be thought out in a quiet, careful, critical way.   Westons conclusion is that Beijing University was uniquely positioned to accomplish the task of mediating the modern and traditional through an essential conservatism that came with the territory of being an intellectual in China, whatever the subject of study.  Rather than seeing Beijing University as a revolutionary place, then, Weston sees it as essentially a liberal institution, rooted in the Republic, and dedicated to the values of intellectual social leadership, individual self-reflection, critical thinking, and service to society as a whole.

*Rickshaw Beijing*: A Short Synopsis

Strand, David.  Rickshaw Beijing:  City People and Politics in the 1920’s.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

In Rickshaw Beijing David Strand takes a unique approach to the history of Beijing during the 1920’s.  Although technically this book is a micro-history, Strand’s subject is extremely complex, and the lens he uses is wide-angle, broadening the view of Beijing as well as deepening it. Beginning with the Rickshaw pullers of Beijing, Strand gradually broadens his focus to include their customers, the police who regulated their activities, the Chamber of Commerce, which acted as an intermediary between citizens and government, warlords and presidents, and even Chiang Kai-shek.  By the end, Strand has led readers through a history of Beijing that takes account of the laboring poor and puts them into a society that includes a complicated mix of social classes and “vertical affinities.”  His view seems to be that the society of Beijing was developing a “public sphere”, both in the sense of Habermas’ discursive concept, and in the way that city planners think of public space.  This hybrid public-discussion-on-the-streets-of-Beijing, in Strand’s narrative, seems to lead to the potential for a political discussion that is chaotic and broad-based yet ultimately brings effective, if not efficient, local politics in a national vacuum.  Strand uses beautiful prose and a gift for story telling to provide readers with an empirical set of studies that de-emphasizes the national events and questions of Republican China, and puts the society of Beijing on stage.

Outline of Strand: *Rickshaw Beijing*

Strand, David.  Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920’s. Berkeley, Los

Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1989.

  1. A Twentieth Century Walled City   p.1
    1. Beijing – physical change was part of the old imperial city -changes coexisted in an ambiguous physical relationship between present and past.
    2. Beijing and Beiping:  Taking the Measure of a Capital in Decline

i.      Imperial center ceased to be used after 1911 Revolution, and Beijing became a de-centered political center which eventually only controlled itself.

ii.      Exit of Zhang Zuolin left Beijing to Nationalists, whose capital was in Nanjing, so Beijing (Northern Capital) became Beiping (Northern Peace).  Further de-centering politics, the city remained important.

iii.      Local residents had a difficult time – they thought of Beijing as the capital, and, as Strand says, were used to thinking of national politics as local business.  The Nationalists (Chiang Kai-shek) were adamant about the capital in Nanjing.

iv.      Still, the possibility of an eventual national gov’t made Beijing the site of officials, non-functional ministries, etc., all awaiting the chance to be part of the next government.

v.      The decline of Manchus in Beijing, and their willingness to take low-paying jobs to pay the rent, etc, led to a poor reputation, which happened to parallel the decline of the Nationalist regime, thus giving Beijing an air of a derelict capital unable to recover.

    1. Local Politics in a Centerless Polity

i.      Under a façade of romantic antiquity, decay, and modern decline, Beijing was vital and complex – excellent police force, energetic journalistic world, Beidai had the best minds in China despite poor pay, busy market, guilds, labor unions, etc…

ii.      Beijing as empty center is in a way emblematic of the empty center of China itself, with warlordism, false democracies, bribery to earn elected office, etc. . .  the change from central authority to the chaotic idea of “will of the people” caused a cultural crisis.

iii.      The very organizational level of the bureaucracies that did work heightened this cultural crisis.  In a way, “hollow” Beijing began to regulate itself.

iv.      “City residents experienced politics as a path that began within their immediate world of shop, school, or neighborhood, and spiraled up through guilds, unions, associations, federations, and chambers.  Beyond organizations operating at the citywide level lay the uncertainties, dangers, and opportunities of regional, national, and international politics” p. 19 – Habermas’ “Public Sphere”

  1. The Rickshaw:  Machine for a Mixed Up Age  p.20
    1. Beijing was awash with rickshaw pullers – the case of the story of ‘Camel’ Xiangzi by Lao She illustrates the pervasiveness of rickshaw pullers, and their image as being present in the making of history in Republican Beijing.
    2. The Rickshaw as a Modern Invention

i.      Invented in Japan in 1860’s, technical improvements quickly made the Rickshaw light & useful, and pervasive in East Asia and India.  In 1940’s pedals and front wheel added to make the pedicab.

ii.      Initially, disliked because they were seen as reducing humans to the level of animals – which were the only other transportation in Beijing after 1886.

iii.      Initially unpopular, before and after the Boxer Rebellion, their numbers grew until in the 1920’s there were 60,000 rickshaw pullers in Beijing.

iv.      Part of the speed up of transportation in the city, like telegraphs, etc.

    1. Passengers

i.      For most Beijing residents, walking was the way to move, esp. those who were laborers

ii.      This, combined with the time- and comfort-saving nature of the rickshaw made it a status symbol for its riders.

    1. Pullers

i.      Pullers came mostly from the lower parts of the working class.  The job offered a place for immigrants and upwardly mobile workers, and a “liferaft” for those out of work or on their way down. (p.33)\

ii.      Rickshaw pullers caused difficulties for upper class and intellectuals partly because the work was demeaning, and partly because it was a reminder of the transitory nature of status and status distinctions. (p. 33)

iii.      Rickshaw pullers’ image as beasts of burden highlighted the social dysfunction and transition period of Republican Beijing, making moral dilemmas and the challenges of modernization clear. (p. 35)

iv.      Strand’s strategy is to place Rickshaw men at the center of his look at Beijing, and to use this as an entry point for his research.

  1. Rickshaw Men:  Careers of the Laboring Poor  p. 38
    1. Earning a living on the street (Lao She’s fictional character and a real puller named Yao Yingrui who tried to commit suicide) p. 43.
    2. Courtyard Slums – the residences of pullers, lower class residences in courtyard tenements – rooms meant to be part of a larger house, where whole families lived on limited income. (p.43) But these did not develop into working class neighborhoods, as they were scattered about the city, and often status between courtyards was intense, preventing larger politico-social groupings.
    3. Owners and Renters

i.      A patron-client relationship developed among rickshaw garages and pullers.  This was a porous division, in which pullers were responsible to the garages, but also their clients.  Garages also did not have high social status.  Market forces in the 1920’s worked so that garages charged different rents, and pullers often shopped around, though some preferred the security of a regular relationship.

    1. Street-level Perspectives on Power and Status

i.      Difference in class between puller and passenger

1.      led to cheating on both sides, and rickshaw man had to enforce fare payment with fists if necessary

2.      differences in dress

3.      Fares negotiated in public, along with other street-sellers, and fares might change after the ride was over.

4.      Deceit and bad faith on both sides.  Rickshaw men were seen as capable of cheating, etc., but were often cheated themselves. (p. 53)

5.      police and rickshaw pullers had a paralel development, and a relationship that was alternately adversarial and cooperative. 54.

6.      rickshaw men – in tenements, lower class, etc, oftsn found selves without power.

ii.      Men Without Power (p.56)

1.      Habermas style, rickshaw men formed assistance groups, helped each other, learned law, and protected themselves – very much public sphere.

2.      Collective Action:  Premonitions And Precedents

3.      willingness to fight ad occasional group solidarity meant they could “overcome an [equally] well documented reputation for powerlessness and vulnerability.

4.      Beijing – slow to act and organize.

5.      low rents dampened conflicts between owners and pullers – (p.61)

  1. Policemen as Mediators and Street-Level Bureaucrats  p. 65
    1. For Rickshaw men, the government was represented most clearly by the police, with whom they dealt on a regular basis.
    2. The police were organized according to the regular organizational units of Beijing – Banner and non-banner, inner and prefecture, etc…
    3. Policing in Beijing changed after the Boxer Rebellion – Kawashima,  Japanese expert on policing, set up a police academy in the Japanese-controlled section of Beijing, which was taken over by his Chinese patron, Prince Su, after Japan left Beijing, and the Japanese faculty maintained.  The Beijing police became a single unit responsible for the city using modern police methods, and inspired police reform around China.
    4. The police were so well organized that their effectiveness and size grew throughout the early twentieth century until Beijing’s reputation was as “one of the best-policed cities in the world” (p.71) Despite protests from magistrates who felt their authority usurped, etc, and the police survived the 1911 revolution, and other events prior to WWII that shook China.
    5. Recruitment and Deployment (p. 73)

i.      By 1911, 12 policemen for every 1,000 residents.

ii.      Like Meiji Japan, most of Beijing’s early policement were ex-bannermen (Manchus).

iii.      Large numbers on the streets, stationed at well-placed positions.

    1. Police rhetoric and practice (p.73)

i.      This closeness to population was a “redrawing of the boundary line between state and society.  Police joining the Public Sphere in formerly private/hidden Beijing.

ii.      Rather than jail miscreants, police were supposed to anticipated problems and nip them in the bud – their goal was to prevent crime by acting as mediators and representatives of order. (p.75-77)

    1. Paternalism, Patriarchy, and the Boundaries of Policed Society (p. 83)

i.      “The police patrolled the public realm between official and private affairs” (p. 87)

    1. Beijing Police Rhetoric and Ideology in Comparative Perspective (p.89)

i.      Beijing police as both modern, and informed by a Chinese Confucian morality that accepted deviance as an inevitable undercurrent of society,  and believed that consensus was possible even in chaotic times. “Enforce the law except when it conflicts with or is overridden by customary practice” (p.91)

    1. Repression and Mediation (p. 92)

i.      Political activists and police control of their activities (p.93)

ii.      Police “field of control” centered in Beijing’s streets and public places (pg.94)

    1. Paying the Price of Bureacratic Expansion (p. 95)

i.      Expansion of Yamen runners into formal police at level of Bureaucrats with salaries was a “bold and expensive stroke” that made for a professional force, but also caused problems paying them, which were constantly shifted as the Republic shifted. (p. 95-97)

  1. Jeweler, Banker, and Restaurateur:  Power Struggles in the Beijing Chamber of Commerce  p. 98
    1. In the absence of elected city government, private organizations came to represent people and take part in discussions of policy.  The Chamber of commerce and other non-official organizations were an avatar for politics “in the same way that the Beijing police came to be an avatar for government.” (p. 99)
    2. The Origins of the Beijing Chamber (p. 99)

i.      1907 Beijing Chamber organized amid a rash of development of chambers in imitation of Shanghai chamber.  The Qing gov’t hoped to help business elites identify their interests with those of the Imperial government and improve economy.

ii.      Within a year of founding, the construction of an official headquarters was seen as a move toward legitimate PUBLIC support and position. (as opposed to private and official)(p.101)

iii.      All over, chambers of commerce played semi-official roles during and after the 1911 revolution.  Still, most fatuan had an ambiguous relationship with power – they became more independent, but not officially powerful.

    1. The Rise and Fall of An Disheng (p. 102)

i.      Before 1920’s, Chamber had passive dependent relationship with authority.(p.102)

ii.      An Disheng strengthened the Chamber by making merchants active in

1.      protesting Republic (Yuan Shikai) policies that caused money market and banking chaos – lobbying for fiscal responsibility, which was in their interests.

2.      Participating in the May 4th movement and nationalism to promote international trade

iii.      One month after his second term, in 1920, he was arrested for misappropriation of funds – he had angered power people in the Anfu-clique.  Bankers were angry because his protest of fiscal policies had caused them problems (they profited from the fiscal chaos of the Republican government) and the May 4th movement villainized members of the Anfu-clique.

    1. A Banker’s Chamber (p.113)

i.      Public rivalry between An Disheng and Zhuo Zuomin

    1. Sun Xueshi and the Realm of Social Intercourse (p. 116)

i.      Sun was a master of social discourse and informal networks – this was the source of his power in the Brothel District, and in the chamber. (p. 117)

    1. One Year of Unopposed Leadership (p. 119)
  1. Profits and People’s Livelihood:  The Politics of Streetcar Development  p. 121
    1. Local Reaction to Technological Change (p. 121)

i.      The streetcar as new linear technology caused uproar, and was incongruous in a preindustrial city.  This caused debate and discussion. (p. 121)

ii.      The key controversy was not modern vs. tradition, or safety, or such, but the possibility of depriving rickshaw pullers of their jobs. (p. 122)

    1. The Founding of the Beijing Streetcar Company (p. 123)

i.      Owned by French BIC, and Chinese investors, then by the French themselves, the Streetcar company was controversial from the ownership/finace perspective (France and already wealthy Chinese owned the shares) and from a business standpoint, and from the standpoint of rickshaw pullers who feared losing their business. (127)

    1. The Politics of People’s Livelihood (p. 127)

i.      Antagonism felt in the Chamber of Commerce toward some of the businessmen who owned shares encouraged the Chamber to voice its sympathy for the Rickshaw pullers in 1922. (p. 128-129)

    1. Streetcar Beijing (134)

i.      The competition between street car and rickshaw was an economic “public sphere” in which the ideas of economic modernization, class and economics, and market advantages were negotiated. (p. 138-9)

  1. Bosses, Guilds, and Work Gangs:  Labor Politics and the Sprouts of Unionism  p. 142
    1. Proletarian Politics in a Preindustrial City (p. 142)

i.      Deng Zhongxia and other Beidai students tried to organize rickshaw pullers and other workers in Beijing with little luck

1.      Beijing society was more vertically divided than horizontally.

2.      Efficient police force and self-government made inroads into that society difficult.

3.      Beidai students were of a different class than the workers. (146-7)

    1. Guilds and Worker Interests (p. 147)
    2. Feuds, Fights, and Factions (p.150)

i.      Patron-client relationships in guilds defied the easy class categories.  Subordination in a hierarchy was normal, but workers were also protected by the hierarchy. (150)

ii.      Opinion among workers that city-wide organization along traditional lines was worthwhile (151-2)

iii.      Internal fighting within guilds and external participation in politics (154)

1.      Guild creation represented “state-building in miniature” (p. 154) – contentious, etc.  [puclic sphere]

    1. The Sprouts of Unionism (p. 163)
  1. Citizens in a New Public Sphere:  Widening Circles of Political Participation  p.  167
    1. Assemblies of Citizens (p. 172)

i.      No tradition of political debate among citizens of towns, but widespread preindustrial participation in associations, guilds, organizations, theaters, etc., predisposed Beijing citizens to public debate, and such associations took their issues into the public in competition with each other. (174-175)

ii.      May 4th Solidified the above, and made the commitment of students seem heroic. (175)

iii.      The fact that citizens could not easily access high power due to bribery, corruption, and exclusivism, meant that local politics became their domain, and that reinforced association style public discourse.

iv.      Improvised citizens assemblies to discuss Shandong concessions throughout the country.

    1. Self-Government (p. 178)

i.      Local self-government was encouraged, and in various meanings, self-government groups. (179)

ii.      Like associations, these groups tended to represent a particular interest or strata (180)

    1. The May Thirtieth Movement (p. 182)

i.      May 30, 1925 nationwide protests against police and foreign violence against protesting Chinese.

ii.      The working out of the national Public Sphere conversation – “mass nationalism” (183)

    1. Professional Politicians and Political Violence (p. 191)

i.      Nationalist and communist political operatives aimed to become guides, rather than just examples as students were. (191)

ii.      Parties were split, but May Thirtieth Movement gave them impetus (193)

iii.      Professional politicians’ use, then abuse of demonstrations and violence led to escalation and the destruction of the public sphere. (195)

  1. City People Under Seige:  The Impact of Warlordism  p.198
    1. City Under Seige (p. 199)

i.      1925-26 warlord infighting – Zhang Zuolin and Feng Yuxian led to more war-consciousness than ever, as escalating violence in the city also led to a siege mentality, rising prices,. (204)

ii.      Most warlord wars fought along rail lines vital to city supplies, furthering sense of siege.

iii.      Formation and support of  Metropolitan Peace Preservation Association (PPA) to alleviate difficulties and high prices, became a new public sphere for self-help in Beijing and negotiations with warlords. PPA became a de-facto government and defense association for Beijing. (203-216)

iv.      PPA establishes control of police (211)

    1. Managing Protection Costs (p. 216)
  1. Union and Faction:  Organized Labor in the Wake of the Northern Expedition  p. 222
    1. Cadres (p. 224)
    2. Unionism (p. 227)
    3. Rebellion in the Ranks (p. 231)
    4. Factionalism (p. 238)
  2. Machine-Breakers:  The Streetcar Riot of October 22, 1929  p. 241
    1. Unions and Crowds (p. 242)
    2. Political Consciousness and Class Consciousness (p. 251)
    3. Prelude to Riot (p.261)
    4. Riot (p. 267)
    5. Conclusion (p. 279)
  3. Order and Movement in City Politics  p. 284
    1. Displaced Development (284)
    2. Politics on the Defensive (288)
    3. Conflict and Cohesion as a Continuous Process (290)

Outline of Weston: *The Power of Position*

Weston, Timothy B.  The Power of Position:  Beijing University, intellectuals, and Chinese Political Culture, 1898-1929. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2004.

I.   Introduction:

a.       Four major contentions:

i.      Beijing U. early history is a perfect space in which to study the way in which humanistic intellectuals
repositioned themselves in chaos, change, etc… (p. 8)

ii.     “the complexity of Beida’s early history has been obscured by the historiography on the
May 4th Movement.” (8)

iii.      Better to study Chinese intellectuals in a broad context, including not only ideas, but social
and institutional history as well.

iv.      Local cultural and social characteristics need to be understood and worked into the history
of intellectuals.

II.    Schools, Politics, and Reform in the Nineteenth Century

a.       Beida has existed since 1898 as a point of contact between state and society. (As Jingshi daxuetang)

b.      The choice to follow Meiji Japan’s example in establishing Beida was a clear choice of modernity.

i.      linking the new U. with wealth and prosperity encouraged conservatives

ii.      In the Qing, access to power was gained through educational achievements. (14)

iii.      For intellectuals in the late Qing/early republic, the chaos, penetration of upper class by merchants,
etc., led to an idealized vision of a China “in which “true” men of learning possessed the highest
social status” (p. 23)

iv.      Huan Zongxi – revitalize politics by revitalizing education, as schools were centers of community
and state activities (p.24)

v.      Reformers still thought that reform could only work best in a completely new institution. (26) & were
heavily influenced by the establishment of Todai in Japan (25).  This blend of conservative thought
and radical action is interesting.

vi.      The First head of the University, Sun Jai’tai, as also in effect “minister of education” for the entire
empire. (34)

vii.      The Jingshi daxuetang survived the 1898 coup by Cixi, but taught only the five classics, and then
was closed down.

III.

IV.   Conclusions

a.       This was a study of how intellectuals in China repositioned themselves after the collapse of the Qing in order to maintain their elite social status and to lead China into modernity.

i.      This began well before the May 4th movement, because of traditional attitudes that intellectuals were
the proper leaders of society.  Thus, informing the May 4th movement, some of the roots of that
movement were conservative rather than radical.

ii.      So, not just motivated by Westernized modernism, the May 4th ideas were “dialectically related” to
the Chinese intellectual past. (p.250)

iii.      Beida became a platform for national leadership because it was both familiar in a traditional sense,
and yet new enough that it was able to continue to evolve with the changes of the times.

iv.      The dialectic is real people acting in relation to events that overshadow the university.(251-2)