Review of Yamashita, “Reading the New Tokugawa Intellectual Histories”

Yamashita, Samuel Hideo.  “Reading the New Tokugawa Intellectual Histories,” in The

Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1.  Winter, 1996.  pp.1-48.

Samuel Hideo Yamashita’s “Reading the New Tokugawa Intellectual Histories” is one of the most useful, and readable, review articles I have encountered.  In it, Yamashita makes a clear delineation of the field into four major “interpretive communities” after discussing reasons for the decline, and then renewed interest in, the intellectual history of Japan from 1600-1868.[1]

The first issue that Yamashita deals with in this 1996 article is a set of reasons for what was at the time a renewed interest in Tokugawa Intellectual History.  According to Yamashita, there were four reasons for this increased participation in the field.  The first, and in Yamashita’s view probably the most important, was the appearance in English of Maruyama Masao’s own discussion of the issues in Nihon Seiji Shisō-shi kenkyū (Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan).  Second, according to Yamashita, was the publication in Japanese of several collections of the work of Tokugawa intellectuals, which made the material more accessible.  Third was an increase in conferences dedicated to the subject, and finally, Harry Harootunian’s Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa Period, the controversial nature of which appears to have enlivened discussions.[2]

Yamashita notes that while interest was on the increase, agreement about the meaning of texts and ideas, their place in the context of the historical narrative, intellectual provenance, and impact on later Japanese history was not.  In fact, Yamashita here defines his four “interpretive communities” (he apparently does not want to preclude the possibility of collusion between groups, as he does not call them schools of thought, though he treats them as if that is what they are in essence).[3] These four schools he calls the “modernization group,” the “de Bary group”, the “New Intellectual History group,” and the “postmodernists”.  In the remainder of the article, Yamashita defines the methodology of each group, and provides a critique of each in relation to the others.  The article provides a very solid sense of the state of the field in 1996.

The first of the interpretive communities that Yamashita dives into is, almost inevitably, the Modernization group.  This group, according to Yamashita, “have been the most influential interpretive community in Japanese studies in the United States.”[4] This is true, he says, to the point where the dominant view of the Japanese past in the United States can be attributed to this group.[5] The exemplar which Yamashita uses for this group is not one of the “big names” such as Reischauer or Bellah (though he does briefly mention Bellah), but Richard Rubinger’s book Private Academies of Tokugawa Japan, whose stunning scope Yamashita describes in a way that sounds much like an extended version of Maruyama’s book.[6]

The point of Yamashita’s look at Rubinger is to emphasize the conception of intellectual history as progressive – searching for the preconditions for the Meiji period and Japan’s modernity, and explaining why Japan was the only non-Western nation to become a modern industrial and military power.  Yamashita refrains from calling this view of Japanese history teleological, however and instead emphasizes the “progress” of modernization historians by looking at the works of Bob Wakabayashi and Kate Nakai.  Yamashita wants to show that the teleological, and uncritically progressive viewpoint of early modernization theorists was tempered by the sophistication of later practitioners.[7]

The next group that Yamashita digs into is the “de Bary group.”  Here, Yamashita gives props to de Bary and his students for forcing the field of Japanese studies to recognize Tokugawa Intellectuals, particularly Neo-Confucian scholars, as belonging to a wider field of Confucian philosophers including those in China and Korea.  After roundly criticizing Japanese studies scholars in the United States for ignoring the possibility that Chinese studies scholars might have a viewpoint in this field, Yamashita goes on to discuss the problems with de Bary’s analysis, as well, noting that he places Japanese Confucianism within a context so large as to make it disappear, showing disappointment in a scholar the caliber of de Bary accepting the simplistic “Japan as copycat” argument, and chastising even the more sophisticated analysis of de Bary’s students for their characterization of Japanese Confucian scholars as simply trying to find a method to characterize the Way for Japanese.[8] The primary critique that Yamashita levels is that the context that de Bary and his students used is too broad, while at the same time, he is pleased to see that the de Bary group provided a corrective for the vision of the modernizationists – namely, that Neo-Confucian scholarship in Japan was not a conservative, obstruction to progress, but a changing, dynamic set of ideals itself.[9]

Yamashita next turns to the “New Intellectual History” group, suggesting that they act as a corrective to the most egregious errors of both the previous groups, providing in their more narrowly contextualized histories and self-aware analyses useful contributions that also attempt to avoid the Euro-centrism of the modernizationists and the over-generalized contextualization of the de Bary group.

Yamashita makes Herman Ooms his first exemplar here, and immediately shows how Ooms’ Tokugawa Ideology goes straight to the heart of the problems of both of the first two groups.  Ooms’ view of Japanese Confucianism as unavoidably influenced by Shintō, and his ability to show how Japanese intellectuals were not limited to Confucian scholars, but existed in many manifestations and experienced change over time counter the theses of the Modernization and de Bary groups quite effectively.

Yamashita characterizes the New Intellectual Historians as trying to recognize themselves within the process of writing as well as work with sufficient sources in Japanese to make their aims as clear as possible, and to avoid the Euro-centrism of the Modernizationists and the over-generalization of the de Bary group.  They succeed at this, according to Yamashita, through the use of European models of linguistic and methodological analysis that may, in fact, be creating a new Euro-centrism, not in assumptions about the reality and superiority of Western culture in the content being presented, but in the use of essentially Western modes of evaluating the evaluation of history.  That is to say, when Harootunian uses Althusser to think about “nativist learning,” are his reading strategies making assumptions about Japanese texts of the Tokugawa era that are really only applicable to European – or even more specifically, French – documents?  Yamashita is still undecided on this, but his critique seems valid, if only for those who use these strategies.[10] Still, Yamashita gives props to the New Intellectual Historians for trying, and says that he thinks this more nuanced approach works to correct over-generalized notions of Japanese history provided by the other two schools, if only because it recognizes what they do not – that objectivist history is problematic.[11]

The key problem that Yamashita notes with the New Intellectual Historians is the potential for theory to overtake history in the content of their work.  This has not, he says, happened for the most part, though he does make clear that the work of Koschmann and Harootunian have been given more scathing indictments on such things that even others in the same group.

Finally, Yamashita turns to the group he calls postmodernists, exemplified by Naoki Sakai.  This, he says, is more likely than any of the other three to fall into the trap of theoretical overdetermination and a paucity of primary sources.  The key difficulty that Yamashita finds with postmodern intellectual history is its, in his view, openness to the impossibility of the project it is undertaking.  He talks almost breathlessly about Sakai’s willingness to recognize his own limitations even as he writes, and to remind the reader of his own subjectivity.[12]

Yamashita seems to see this postmodern history as a further narrowing of the context of the field, so that even the author is immaterial to the history being written, and all that is attended to is the superficial text itself – the assumption being that such is the only thing that a historian can actually have access to.[13] Other assumptions – about authorial intent, cause and effect, even the direct relation of events – is too interior, and the only analysis that can be made is intertextual.[14]

Yamashita’s chief critique of the postmodernists is concentrated solely on Sakai, and consists primarily of the recognition that other postmodern historians have done much more with their methodology than he has.  “My point,” Yamashita says, “is that the postmodern turn makes possible much more than what Sakai, in his extraordinary book, has shown us.”[15]

Ultimately, Yamashita sees this division of thought on Tokugawa thought to be a healthy turn in the field.  The discussion goes on, rather than remaining in one unself-critical field.  As Yamashita says, “All historians make these rhetorical choices.  Although some do so consciously, most make them without realizing it.”[16] That the field of Tokugawa Intellectual History has a set of groups making conscious choices, and in debate with each other about those choices, makes the field vital and useful.

Yamashita’s analysis is a good one, but falls prey to some of the critiques he levels as his authors.  This may be to some degree a function of the time in which he wrote it – more than a decade ago, now – and so the various camps have come to see each other in different lights, and have factionalized somewhat.  In attempting to contextualize the field, to borrow a metaphor from his own discussion of the de Bary group, Yamashita has to some degree over-generalized in creating his four categories.  It is, in 2007, hard to imagine Ooms and Harootunian inhabiting the same intellectual space.  Harootunian and Sakai seem to have more in common than the former two, and the position of postmodernists has come to be dominated by the University of Chicago.  In addition, the very difficulty, and the vociferous nature of the critiques of, this postmodernist school, seems to have driven a wedge into the field, making intellectual history both the province of the postmodernists (who dominate the field and allow little room for others with a different approach), and an arcane discipline that holds little appeal to the current crop of graduate students in Japanese studies.

As a foundation for understanding the field in the last decades of the twentieth century, and as a primer for the field as it is today, Yamashita’s analysis is a very good one.  Still, it needs updating.


[1] Samuel Hideo Yamashita, “Reading the New Tokugawa Intellectual Histories” in The Journal of Japanese Studies (22:1, Winter 1996), 4.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., 6.

[5] Ibid., 7.

[6] Bid., 8,9.

[7] Ibid., 9,10.

[8] Ibid., 15.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., 37.

[11] Ibid., 36.

[12] Ibid, 38,39.

[13] Ibid., 42.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid., 43.

[16] Ibid., 46.

Sowing the Seeds: Nakayama Shimpei and the Field of Popular Culture Production in 1920’s Japan

This paper sets out to contextualize the life of one prewar Japanese cultural producer who operated within the heterogeneous edge of Bourdieu’s theoretical field of cultural production:  popular song composer Nakayama Shimpei.

Nakayama Shimpei is not the best known among Japanese composers, but he was one of the most prolific, creating more than 300 songs in his lifetime.  Many of Shimpei’s songs are so well known in Japan today that they have become a part of the cultural fabric, sung by all, though few know who first created them.  They are a part of the invented tradition of Japanese popular music.  Children in kindergarten learn some of Nakayama’s simple songs, including the appeal for good weather in Teru teru bozu, and the call to come home played on the local fire station loudspeakers at 6:00 pm each day, also known as Yūyake koyake.

Nakayama Shimpei was born March 22, 1887, the twentieth year of the Meiji era, to Nakayama Kannosuke and his wife Zou, in Shimotaka-gun, Hinomura (currently, Nakamura-city, Daijishinno #65) in Nagano Prefecture.[1] His family was a transplant from Gunma prefecture (Joshu), and became gono (wealthy farmers) after settling in Hinomura.[2]

There was no history of music or musicians in the Nakayama family, but Shimpei’s father’s older brother, the sixth head of the family since the move from Gunma Prefecture, supplemented his income by working at a local comedy establishment known as the Uguisu-ya.  He enjoyed doing comedy so much that in middle age he renounced his patrimony, passing it to Shimpei’s father, and moved to Edo to try to break into the business.  He was unsuccessful, working as a tax and bill collector in order to survive, never able to quit his day job.[3]

Because of his older brother’s move to Edo, Shimpei’s father Kannosuke took over the family farm and other businesses.[4]

Shimpei was born to a large family.  He was the fourth surviving child (two of his elder sisters had already died by the time he arrived in the world), and would have at least one younger sibling, a brother, born in February, 1889.  When Shimpei was three years old, in 1890, his eldest brother Kanzo died.  The cause of death is not clear, nor is the effect of the death on Shimpei’s parents.[5]

At age six, Shimpei entered elementary school, starting at Nagano Prefecture Kakoi-gun Mura-ritsu Hino Jinjo Elementary School in April of 1893.[6] In July of that same year, Shimpei’s father Kannosuke died.  His death would require major adjustments as Shimpei’s mother Zou had to make ends meet.  Whatever wealth the family may have had up to this point seems to have dissipated in this period.  Also because of these events, Shimpei’s schooling was cut short in 1897, when he was ten years old.  After graduating with honors from the fifth grade, and giving the valedictory address at the graduation ceremony, Shimpei had to leave school in order to help his mother with the many responsibilities of running a gono household.[7]

Later, in a 1935 article for Chuo Koron, Shimpei would remember that music education in his first years at elementary school was rather limited:  “at the time, elementary school music education was not as extensive as it is today. There was no chance to look at written music, and no specifically scheduled time for musical education in the school day.  It was just done when there was some free time, and only sung and heard.”[8]

He goes on to say that, “If I remember right it was around the time I was in second grade that a baby organ was first provided.[9] It was just at the time the Sino-Japanese war began, so we played epic energetic military marches like Toshima no ikusei and Yuukan naru suihei on this baby organ and sang our young hearts out.  There is no reason to say that such singing had any special effect on me at the time, but it is a fact that gunka (literally “military songs”  軍歌) left me with a love for music that I was unaware of then.”[10] Shimpei was stirred not by the strains of Beethoven or Wagner, but by marches and army songs.  The nearest American equivalent might be the military marches of John Philip Sousa.

So, instead of an inspired prodigy, we have an every day kid.  During his childhood, Shimpei participated in street fights with students from other elementary schools, stole and ate watermelons from the fields, and even once conned a band conductor into letting his friend onto the stage with the flutes at festival time – even though the friend couldn’t play.[11] He was a talented musician in his local area, but he was no stand-out composer growing up hidden from the world in rural Nagano, and was certainly not already marked to be one of the most remembered composers in Japan’s modern history.  In fact, much of Shimpei’s life has a kind of accidental quality about it.

In 1898, Shimpei’s older brother Akiyoshi was promoted from his work in the village administrative office to a post at the district (‘gun’) level.  This promotion brought enough money to the family to allow Shimpei to return to school, and he was matriculated at the local higher elementary school in April of that year.[12] Poor performance in his first two years of higher elementary school forced him to drop out, however, and he returned again to work, this time apparently as much to mollify his mother’s disappointment as to earn money for the family.[13] In his diary, Shimpei says he will never forget that year (1900) because the burden of his mother’s disappointment over his failure in school made the tough work in a Kimono cloth maker’s shop even harder.[14]

Eventually, Shimpei did graduate from the higher elementary school.  While there the second time around, he had become quite interested in literature and current events, and did especially well in music and physical education.[15]

In 1905, at age 18, and after graduating from school, Shimpei began to worry about his future. Eventually, he decided to go to college and become a teacher.[16]

Ambitious, and ready to begin on a path to his own future, Shimpei took a deep plunge in July of 1905, setting his sights on Tokyo, and on gaining the necessary credentials for his chosen career.  His desire was to become a teacher, and already he was showing signs of interest in a literature as well as music, both of which would become the roots of experience that served him so well as a popular song composer.  Aside from learning to play the organ, he had already joined a local poetry and music study group known as the Wakasaikai (若采会), the purpose of which was to read and write so-called new poetry and to publish a new, and very short-lived literary journal for Nagano youth called Hokushinbungei (北信文芸).[17]

Lamenting in his diary that “if I don’t achieve my dream, I cannot come home,” he accompanied a friend who had enlisted in the army on his way to Nagano city.[18] Once his friend had gone on to the recruiting station at Ueda, Shimpei continued his journey to Tokyo, stopping at Takazaki along the way.  He talks about seeing soldiers, and visiting the gates of training grounds to watch recruits being put through their paces, and about how their commitment to protect the nation moves him.[19] This appears to be, again, a formative experience related to his musical memories of the Sino-Japanese War, and the patriotic fever gripping Japan itself as he was going up to the capitol.

Literature and music came together even further upon Shimpei’s arrival in Tokyo, at Ueno station on November 29, 1905.  It was here that he met Shimamura Hogetsu, a fellow native of Nagano, who had agreed to put Shimpei up in his home in exchange for some household work, and to guide him in his studies.[20]

Hogetsu had lived for short periods in both Russia and England, and was interested in translating and popularizing the literature of those two cultures.   He was also a Waseda University professor of Literature, and restarted the literary journal Waseda Bungaku in 1906. Waseda Bungaku was filled with the work of a variety of writers, but quickly also became a vehicle for Shimamura’s translations, and his own essays and plays.  He seems mostly to have been interested in drama, translating and publishing in the journal several plays within his first five years.  That year, Hogetsu also founded the Bungei Kyoukai, a literature and drama production group.  This organization would be, in 1914, the organizer for Shimpei’s popular music debut when it produced Tolstoy’s Ressurection, dramatized, set to music, and translated into Japanese.  The first production sponsored by the Bungei Kyoukai was to be performed that very month – November of 1905 at the Kabukiza in Ginza.  On the bill were Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice and the musical Shouon. [21]

In 1906, Shimpei was 19, living in Tokyo with the Shimamura family as houseboy for Hogetsu.  From this time on, as mentor more than master, Hogetsu encouraged Shimpei to study music, even providing a room in his house where Shimpei could practice on a used organ he purchased with money from the work at the Shimamura house.  Hogetsu also taught him English in his spare time, and talked about the performing arts with Shimpei frequently.  It is clear, also, that Hogetsu’s advice, related to his own popularizing of Western Literature, had some influence on the way Shimpei thought about the music he was beginning to study.  Hogetsu advised him that composing popular music for Japanese would mean making traditional sounding music, rather than creating a new, Western, sound.  Hogetsu’s advice would find its way into most of the popular songs Shimpei composed after 1914, in which he manipulated Western music notation, and musicology, to produce a sound that could be written for any instrument, but sounded distinctly Japanese and traditional as well.  This is the yonanuki scale discussed below.

So, while working for Hogetsu, Shimpei worked to achieve his dream of entering the Tokyo Conservatory of Music (東京音楽大学), even taking lessons at the Tokyo Music Association ( 東京音楽協会) in Kanda.[22] He was already thinking of the kinds of songs that would later flow from his piano, even while he retained his goal of becoming an elementary school music teacher.

In 1908 Shimpei successfully tested into the Tokyo Conservatory of Music, and began his formal education.[23] In 1909, as classes began, Shimpei majored in Piano, and was taking piano, music theory and composition, music history, German, Japanese, violin, and voice.[24] Perhaps one reason that Shimpei is, and was, taken seriously as a composer despite the genres of music he chose to work with had to do with his formal education in the most respected academy of music in Japan at the time.  His position in the field of musical production was secured, in great part, by this education.  His skills thus firmly established, he could be taken seriously as a composer no matter what he chose to create from his well-healed keyboard.

As he had at the end of his childhood education in 1905, upon graduating from the conservatory in 1912, he immediately began worrying about his future, explaining that as a composer he still had not found his voice, wondering how he was going to make money, alone in Tokyo with no job. [25] He resolved to write articles for Waseda Bungaku as often as he can, and says he is taking evening classes in foreign language.[26]

In 1912, Shimpei began working as a school music teacher in a poor district of Tokyo, and writing for Waseda Bungaku in his spare time.[27] In 1914, Hogetsu determined to turn Tolstoy’s novel into a musical production, and asked Shimpei to write the theme song for one of the characters to appear in the play.[28] The song, in which the main character sings a lament to the love of his life, was made to tug on heartstrings.  After Kachyusha sold 20,000 records in the first year, Nakayama’s name became quite well known, and the success kicked off an era some historians of Japanese music have called the era of show tunes.

It seems that the most popular songs sold as records after the success of Kachyusha’s Song were nearly all from productions like that created by Hogetsu and Nakayama – musical dramatizations of famous Western literature, or productions of Western operas in Japanese language.  Tabako nomenome was written for a Japanese version of Carmen, and Nakayama’s most popular song, even today, and most important in terms of establishing Japanese popular music style, was also one of these show tune spin-offs called Sendo kouta (Boatman’s song), which was featured in a musical version of Turgenev’s The Night Before.[29]

These songs borrowed from Western music, and from Japanese music, but were not confined by the musical rules of either style, and came to be known as Shimpei Songs.[30] Sendo kouta in particular , Nakayama’s biggest hit, used a “minor yonanuki scale” to achieve a sound that is more traditionally Japanese than a Western style scale can, and the use of this scale, along with the arrangement of the song, made it the model on which composers of Japanese popular music would base their tunes from that point on.[31]

A large part of Nakayama’s success in the music industry, and in society at large, came between in 1927 and 1928, after the publication and recording of Sendo kouta.  Nakayama’s success at using the minor yonanuki scale and blending Western and Japanese musical styles, and the effectiveness of the lyrics provided for his songs by his collaborators Noguchi Ujo, Shimamura Hogetsu, and Kitahara Hakushu led to a series of new developments in popular music, none of which were fully or originally Shimpei’s own, but by which he was able to capturing the popular mood time and again.  The popularity of His “Boatman’s Song” (Sendo kouta), produced in 1922, comes clear when we recognize that several record companies published recordings of the song by various artists.  This song was popular enough in its day to drive the market.  With tunes like Sendou Kouta, Kimi Koishi, and many others, the decade of the 1920’s provided the gold standard – the model on which most popular songs came to be built.  Sendou Kouta was the specific model.  Its minor yonanuki scale, the popularity of its lyrics, and the mood of the music itself all helped to place this particular song at the tope of Japanese popular music sales.  Shimpei Himself became so popular, and his music so enduring that in 1987 the Nippon Victor company released  a compilation of his greatest hits to commemorate what would have been his hundredth birthday.

For many critics, Sendou kouta was a bit dark in its outlook, regardless of its popular success.  Noguchi Ujo’s lyrics (”I am withered grass on the river bank.  You, the same.  We’ll never flower in this world,”) combined with the dark tones of Nakayama’s minor yonanuki scale, made it seem overly pessimistic.[32] The song, however, remained popular among the public, and so this reversal of fortunes only opened the way for Nakayama and others to improve on this new model of popular song.  Nakayama and Noguchi produced Habu no Minato (The Harbor of Habu) in 1928, and production could not keep up with sales.[33] Inspired by this Nippon Polydor executives conceived of the first popular song to be produced from the beginning as a song for recording, rather than as a popular song picked up after performances made it a hit.  This song, Kimi Koishi (You, Sweetheart), was designed, as critics of pop music today lament regularly, to be innocuous, less depressing, less reflective of the times, than Sendo kouta.  A love song, it hit the market with a splash, and the market never looked back, adopting, on the urging of the President of Nippon Victor, American Benjamin Gardner, the American marketing style where record companies designed and manufactured hits for the market, becoming part of the productive process, rather than simply distributors of products.[34]

By 1921, for example, a new style of popular music, shin-minyo, was beginning to make inroads into the music sales market, spurred on by the participation of Noguchi Ujo, Nakayama’s lyricist collaborator, in a poetic movement of the same name.[35] In 1924, Nakayama produced the most popular song of that genre, Suzaka kouta .

Shin-minyo was intended by its creators to be directly related to the Folk songs of Tokugawa era villages in style and content.  Its proponents, composers and listeners from the cities (primarily Tokyo) made it into a movement that had two primary goals.  First, it was a conscious attempt to return to idealized Japanese tradition.  Second, composers, performers, and audiences of shin-minyo were attempting to recover a sense of Japanese identity, and to make a profit doing so.  They created this new music based on what they thought was a pan-Japanese folk music tradition.  One of the primary architects of this movement, Kitahara Hakushu (also one of Shimpei’s collaborators) wrote that “Japanese folk songs, once the voice of the people and the land, have since the Meiji period largely lost their local color and folkness. . . [authentic] folk songs which still preserve their original dignity are extremely rare.”[36] Hakushu’s goal, in part, was to keep this tradition alive by writing new songs in its image.  The result of the work of Hakushu and Shimpei, among others, though, was a creation of another hybrid.  This musical style used the yonanuki scale – an adaptation of western musical notation and organization – in order to provide a standard way for composers to record their ideas.  It was also, as mentioned earlier, written mostly for city dwellers, originally to provide music that would satisfy their desire for memories of their hometowns, and later to idealize Japanese rural life as a pan-Japanese furusato, or hometown.  Eventually, as with Shimpei’s Suzaka kouta, these songs came to be written on commission for factories, or onsen villages, as advertisements to entice city dwellers to return to the countryside – to their Japanese heritage in the form of a generalized furusato, but to act, and spend, like tourists.  This music is an interesting blend of tradition and modern, of culture and market.  Its origins with Kitahara Hakushu and Nakayama Shimpei show an attempt to bring traditional music back into modern Japan, but it is driven by a modern market, and commissioned by modern businesses who wish to capitalize not on local economics, but on the national economics of a modern state.  In a way, shin-minyo often seems like the equivalent of Kawabata Yasunari’s opening to the novel Snow Country (Yuki guni).  It evokes a past that is no longer there, and revels in the sentimentality of the memory, by claiming its own location within the tradition of that past.

It seems clear that Nakayama Shimpei was in on the ground floor of the creation of the popular music industry in Taisho and Showa Japan.  It remains, now that we have a skeletal chronology of his life, to look at the field of popular culture and place him within it.

The heterogeneous edge of the field of cultural production (which I will call the field of popular culture) in Japan during the period from 1906 to about 1930 was in the process of expansion.  The arrival of the record industry (Nippon Columbia set up shop in 1907, Nippon Victor and Deutsche Polydor in 1928), and the eventual creation of songs for the popular market specifically, rather than as street songs, or within specific genres of traditional music, and by industrial means of production and distribution, meant a much more direct contact between music producers and distributors and the society at large.  This tended to expand the field on its heterogeneous edge, making new space for music makers with both new means, and new styles to add.

Among those new producers, Nakayama Shimpei played a critical role, though he was not the only one.  The inventors of the yonanuki scale, so useful for adapting traditional Japanese music to western style musical notation, and then transposing it to Western musical instruments, were critical in forming the possibility of this field.  They included Kitahara Hakushu, Soeda Azenbo, and other early producers of popular street songs known as jiyumin enka.  This music transformed into a popular music, rather than a politically motivated street patter, after the promulgation of the 1890 constitution, and as these three and others set some of the songs to music, and wrote other, less political and more sentimental songs in the first decade of the 20th century.

In Nakayama’s own time, the production of popular songs intended specifically to appeal to mass audiences in terms of both words and melodic form was the result in large part of the activities of Shimamura Hogetsu, and the Bungei Kyoukai, translating European literature and plays into English, and popularizing them by setting them to music.  Kachyusha’s song is the earliest example of this.[37]

In addition, the other major composers of popular song during Nakayama’s lifetime were very few – Soeda, Narita Tamezo, Sasa Koka, and a few others.[38] The number of lyricists slightly larger, but all worked with all of the composers, and the record companies shared their services as well as those of the most popular singers.  Hence, the world of popular music production was relatively small, and in many ways, its inhabitants worked together as they created a new commercial entity within Japan’s field of cultural production.[39]

What seems to set Nakayama apart in this world, making him one of its most sought-after, and prolific composers, was his revolutionary use of the minor yonanuki scale to compose the Sendo kouta (Boatman’s Song), and the fact that he did not come from Tokyo, which appears to have made him interested in music, culture, and life outside the great urban areas of pre-war Japan.  At least, they appear frequently in his songs, and those appearances, like the music in Sendo kouta, seem to have paved the way for others to follow.  Nakayama’s inspirations, and willingness to write for various markets, his ability to understand those markets in terms of the preferences of people who made them up, and the ways in which those people were entering the modern world, seem to have put him at the forefront of an industry that was expanding at an amazing speed in the early 20th century.

Nakayama Shimpei’s life, then, was a process of position-takings, some conscious, others less so, that eventually led him to a life of reasonable prosperity. Never the less, Nakayama Shimpei has also become a kind of culture hero – Japan’s music man – the standard by which the impact of other Japanese composers, including the even more famous 1930’s sensation Koga Masao, have been measured within the field of popular music production.

In Bourdieu’s field of cultural production it is not clear, then, where Shimpei stands.  His songs sold well, and set up the music industry for greater and greater impact on the fields of power and economics.  This might make him a part of the heterogeneous end of the field.  However, the artistic, and technical importance of his work, and the reverence in which he seems to be held by listeners and composers alike, during his time and ours, seems to put him closer to the homogeneous edge – a place of great cultural capital.  As a cultural producer, Nakayama Shimpei seems to have been as much an enabler of market oriented popular culture as he was a cultural icon.  Perhaps he stands at both ends of the field:  well regarded, with great sales numbers.


[1] Nakayama, Urō. Nakayama Shimpei sakyoku kokuroku nenpyo [中山晋平 作曲刻六年表]

(Nakayama Shimpei: A Chronology of a composer).  1980. p. 287.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Nakayama, Urō, p. 288.

[8] Nakayama Shimpei, Autobiography of Nakayama Shimpei (Nakayama Shimpei jiden中山晋平自伝) in Chuo Koron, Showa 10, August, 1935, p. 374-375.  Shimpei here appears to be referring to the fact that his elementary school had no instruments to accompany the students, so music class was either a kind of music appreciation, or  just group singing.

[9] Ibid.  According to the Nakano city history, a baby organ was provided for the Hino Elementary School in March of Meiji 26.   It is unclear if this is the same organ mentioned above.

[10] Ibid/, p. 376.

[11] Nakayama, Urō, p. 288. Quoting Shinanokyoiku “Nakayama Shinpei Special Edition (Showa 40, October issue) Shinano Kyou\ikukai.  According to a former classmate, a Mr. Arataki,  “Shinpei and I were both bald like Buddhist monks during our school years, and we always had rock fights with the kids from other districts.  We also played lots of hide and seek with our friends, and sometimes we’d go break a watermelon in the field and eat it there.  We still attended the third level shrine of Shinno when we were kids, and Nakayama played the flute there every year, and was very good at it.  However there were only two chairs for flute players, and one more was needed, so Shinpei said to me “Arataki, you play, and even if you don’t make any sounds, just move like you’re playing, so we sat together in the flute place.”

[12] Ibid., p. 288.

[13] Ibid., p. 289.

[14] Ibid., p. 289.

[15] Ibid., p. 289.

[16] Ibid., p. 291.

[17] Ibid., p. 291.

[18] Ibid., p. 291.

[19] Ibid., p. 292.

[20] Ibid., p. 292.

[21] Ibid., 292-293.

[22] Ibid., 293.

[23] Ibid. 295.

[24] Ibid. 295.

[25] Ibid. 297.  This is an interesting point to come to in the narrative of Nakayama Uro, and I wonder if he was aware of the similarities between Shimpei’s situation in 1912, and that of Shimpei’s uncle in Edo before his birth.  Although historically it really has no use in explaining Shimpei’s life, it certainly has the quality of a story that might have been a family treasure of some sort – contributing to the legend of Shimpei.  It would be interesting to find more on this.

[26] Ibid. 298.

[27] Ibid. 300.

[28] Ibid.,  302.

[29] Ishikawa Hiroyoshi, Gouraku no senzenshi (娯楽の戦前史) (A History of Prewar Entertainment Culture), (Tokyo:  Toshosensho, 1981),  73.

[30] Ibid., 73.

[31] Ibid., p. 74. A yonanuki scale is basically a Western 7 tone scale (8 tones if you include the octave) from which the fourth (yon) and seventh (nana) have been removed (nuku) hence  hence YoNaNuki.  This sort of scale gives a series of tones that in combination sound more like the tonal mix of older Japanese instruments, particularly the Koto and Shamisen.  Thus, this is a sort of “Easternization” of a Western tonal system.  For more on this see Sonobe Saburo, A History of Japanese Popular Music (日本の流行歌史) and Nakamura Toyo, “Early pop song writers and their backgrounds” in Popular Music, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Cambridge, England:  Cambridge University Press) 1991.

[32] Nakamura Toyo, “Early pop song writers and their backgrounds” in Popular Music, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Cambridge, England:  Cambridge University Press, 1991), 266.  In this case, the translation belongs to Nakamura.

[33] Ibid., 267.

[34] Ibid. 267-268. Nippon Polydor, along with Nippon Victor, were formed in the mid 1920’s to capitalize on increasing music sales in Japan.  The parent company of Nippon Polydor was Deutsche Polydor, which owned its Japanese subsidiary fully.

[35] Ibid., 279.

[36] Kitahara Hamushu, Nihon minyo sakka shu (Tokyo:  Dainihon Yubenkai, 1927), 3-4.

[37] Nakamura Toyo, p. 266.

[38] Ibid., p. 267-268

[39] Ibid., 265-277.

Maruyama Masao: *Studies in the intellectual history of Tokugawa Japan*

Maruyama Masao.  Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, Mikiso Hane, trans. (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1974)

Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan was Maruyama Masao’s first effort in his overall attempt to find an explanation of the modern history of Japan which did not depend wholly on Marxist theory, nor give all of the credit for Japan’s modernization to the West.  In his introduction he makes clear the environment in which he was writing: Japan in the 1930’s and 1940’s.  The context Maruyama gives, including the war in Asia, the conference at Kyoto University on “Overcoming Modernity” and the general intellectual climate make it quite amazing that a critical analysis of Tokugawa era thought could be written at all.  Maruyama’s book, however, does the job well.

In the first part of the book, Maruyama attempts to explain the success of Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan by likening that period to the Hegelian “static history” of China.  The relatively stable nature of Tokugawa society and its rigid, reified social structure make this period, unlike others in Japan, perfect for the growing popularity of Confucianism that Maruyama wants to talk about.

After setting the stage, Maruyama discusses the dominant school of Confucian thought in Tokugawa Japan, Chu Hsi Confucianism, discussing how early philosophers including Fujiwara Reika and Hayashi Razan uncoupled Confucianism from Buddhism, with which it had been closely related in Japan, and how it provided the thesis of Tokugawa social and intellectual organization.  Maruyama does an excellent job of showing how Chu Hsi Confucianism amalgamates other traditions in Chinese philosophy, including yin/yang ideology, among others, and creates a unique place for itself in Chinese intellectual history.  This very uniqueness, though, according to Maruyama, makes Chu Hsi Confucianism very inflexible, so that its followers really cannot evolve without punching irreparable holes in the overall system.

This sets up well the direction and target of the book:  an explanation of the development of the Kokugaku school of thought in the late Tokugawa, which, Maruyama says, turned Chu Hsi Confucianism on its head, and yet never escaped the feudal beginnings of the Tokugawa political economy.

Maruyama’s discussion of the tenets of Chu Hsi Confucianism is thorough, coherent, and lucid.  The organization of his essay takes a reader easily through a complex set of ideas.  The only critiques possible here are that Maruyama’s description is a little too coherent, giving the reader a sense that he has encapsulated the universe of Japanese intellectualism in Chu Hsi philosophy, which sends a false message that Confucianism was the only stream of thought in the Tokugawa era that mattered.  In fact, he makes special note of this fact later in the book when he shows that the Kokugaku scholars located the beginning of their own ideas in the 17th century, so that the Chu Hsi thinkers of the Tokugawa period could not have been its intellectual progenitor.

Maruyama makes a case that the majority of Chu Hsi scholars were unable, because of the closed nature of Chu Hsi philosophy, to do anything more than reiterate the basic tenets of the founding thinker.   This means, though, that the rigidity of Chu Hsi thought was bound to change as the Tokugawa political and social system changed over their course of existence.  In a way, this is the antithesis of his original point – that Chu Hsi Confucianism was successful in Tokugawa Japan because of its feudal rigidity, which made it a static society analogous to that of China.  However, he also uses this idea of slow change in the Tokugawa period to underpin a history of the subtle variations in Chu Hsi thought that evolved over the course of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, as Tokugawa society evolved.  He discusses the objections to Chu Hsi orthodoxy of such figures as Yamaga Sōkō, Ito Jinsai, and Kaibara Ekken, each of whom put a crack in the foundation of the Chu Hsi school, either through innovative ideas, or through rigid adherents to the fundamental tenets.

Maruyama locates the real revolution in Japanese Confucian thought, though, in Ogyū Sorai, whose ideas, he says, led to a “complete collapse of the Chu Hsi school.”[1]

Maruyama then goes into the characteristics of the Sorai school, while acknowledging that there were still other Confucian lines of thought in existence, and that the Chu Hsi line was not completely gone by any means.  He gives an account of Sorai’s interest in philology, or kobunji-gaku – the investigation of the meaning of words and ideas in the context of their own time, and explains the secular, political leaning of Sorai’s ideas.

Using his system of uncovering the ancient meanings of words, Sorai cam to emphasize the Six Slassics, rather than the Four Books that were so important to the Chu Hsi scholars.  He devalued any works later than these as being essentially polemical – reactions against the thought of others in the Hundred Schools period, and thus impure ideas already changed by the changing meaning of words.  He also carefully defined The Way as belonging specifically to the Early Kings as human beings, and consequently, even though they were for him sages, they were also human, and not gods.  This made his thought both universal, and heavily political in focus.  Maruyama even compares Sorai here to Machiavelli.

In keeping with his own goals, Maruyama in chapter four makes the link between the Sorai School and Kokugaku, contending that the two were linked, if not in intellectual genealogy, at least in terms of association, common interests, and similar approaches to the problems they set themselves.

Maruyama’s first point here is that Sorai’s ideas were in two general directions, one secular and political, the other secular and social.  After his death, according to Maruyama, his students split along these lines, with the social/literary line moving more and more toward literary criticism, and the political line becoming increasingly uncompromising and inflexible in its application of Sorai’s ideas.

Both Sorai’s school and the Kokugaku school of Motoori Norinaga.  , he says, were interested in The Way as essentially political, but where Sorai and his followers saw The Way, and the examples of the Early Kings as universal, Norinaga made them specific, saying that there is no one Way, but that the Way is different depending on one’s cultural and political context.  Thus, the Way for Japanese must be different from the Way for Chinese.

What is important here is Maruyama’s method of analyzing this connection.  In a very Hegelian way, he sees the Kokugaku scholars as the antithesis of the Sorai school.  He emphasizes the connection between the two in order to juxtapose their ideas.  Since both are in fact dealing with The Way of Confucianism, even if one is in the process of rejecting it, neither has escaped it.  This is the way toward a synthesis which will bring a new paradigm according to the Hegelian model of historical change.  Maruyama is here trying to show that Japanese intellectuals, while they were still trapped in a feudal mode of thought (or perhaps because they were so trapped), were developing an indigenous kind of modernity.  His careful discussion of the development of political and philosophical differentiation of national morality and religion, as when he shows that Norinaga was able to use Sorai’s personalization of the Confucian Sages to make them human, and thus subject to error.  This allowed Norinaga to claim that Japan’s emperors were related to gods, and for the Kokugaku scholars, this made Japanese belief systems in fact more real than those of Chinese Confucianism, since the sages were humans reacting to social context, while Japan’s emperors were descended from the creators.

Ultimately, Maruyama comes back to his own reasons for doing the history that he has undertaken.  In his conclusion, he makes it clear that he sees an intellectual history of Tokugawa era Japan as legitimate in part because it does not fit within the political chronology, but shows a development of its own, and in part because, he admits, he is looking for the growth of a modern consciousness in Japanese thought.  He apologizes for concentrating solely on the disintegration of Confucianism by way of noting that Confucianism was at the beginning of the Tokugawa period the main stream of Japanese philosophical thought, and that its disintegration was unexpected.  Once again, in his conclusion, he turns to the Hegelian construction of thesis, antithesis, synthesis, by suggesting that the pre-modern consciousness of the early Tokugawa period had to be erased through a process by which Confucian rationalism was replaced by the irrational and the subjective (Kokugaku), and then the synthesis of the two would create a new modern paradigm.

What Maruyama leaves unsaid, but implicit in his formulation, is that this movement toward modernity was interrupted by the arrival of Commodore Perry and those who followed from the West, and necessity and contact forced a Western modernity on Japan, and that this uncomfortable modernity led to many of the problems that would become the cause of the Second World War.

Maruyama’s thesis is compelling, and his analysis and command of ideas and history superb.  However, the entire book is more complete than I expected it to be, with all loose ends tied up, even though, by his own admission, Maruyama fails to deal with other streams of political, moral, and religious thought that were available in the same period.  Such neatly tied up ends seem to suggest, and evidence Maruyama presents support this, that in many cases, the theory here has driven the evidence rather than the other way around.  Maruyama is searching for an alternative “Japanese Modernity,” and in the sophistication and concreteness of Kokugaku ideas, he finds what he is looking for.


[1] Maruyama, p.67.

Ikegami: *Bonds of Civility*

Ikegami, Eiko, Bonds of Civility:  Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origins of Japanese Culture, Cambirdge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, 2005).

In Bonds of Civility, Eiko Ikegami, a Sociologist, is refreshingly unapologetic about finding in her archaeology of Japanese aesthetic culture the preconditions of modernity – of the Meiji state, and of Japanese political, national, and social consciousness within aesthetic culture of the Edo period.[1] In fact, I found a number of ideas in Ikegami’s work to be free of the heavy debate over the nature of Japanese “modernity” that so overwhelms historians on both sides of the 1868 line.

Rather than rehash this debate, Ikegami moves very quickly, and in a lucid, well-constructed way, to give recognition to the complications that her “pre-conditions” argument creates for her, to set up a more complex version of Modernization Theory which recognizes no break in 1868, but rather posits a continuum of change from the 17th through the 20th centuries.  Ikegami here is clearly closely connected to Hegel and Habermas in the way she views history as progressive.  In fact, she directly acknowledges Habermas’ idea of the “Public Sphere” in her claim that Japan is moving toward civility during the Tokugawa period.[2]

Still, one of the most interesting and useful streams of though in Ikegami’s book is the distinction she makes between the “civil society” which Habermas describes as developing in 18th and 19th century Europe, and the “civility” she claims developed in Japanese aesthetic culture over roughly the same period.[3] In Chapter One the subject is “Civility without Civil Society”, and Ikegami here focuses on the fact of the success of the warrior elite at maintaining privilege, social distinction and hierarchy, and the creation of a de-centralized state as evidence that civil society, as Habermas defines it, with a political dimension, could not exist, but that civility – horizontal relationships, could.[4]

For Ikegami, the development of civility in Tokugawa aesthetic and cultural practice is a part of her argument for the Tokugawa period as a time of development in the direction of the “Modernity” of Meiji.  However, Ikegami, unlike the Modernization School historians, does not preclude the possibility of other modernities in Japanese development during and after the Tokugawa period.  She does try to make the point that when the political, economic, and military centralization occurred after 1868, social structures for civil society were already in existence, in the form of highly developed civility, based on the horizontal relations of aesthetic and cultural associations.  Ikegami in fact defines civility as,”the effective grammar of sociability [which] allowed Tokugawa individuals to interact safely and confidently with those individuals whose backgrounds were unknown or apparently different from their own.”[5] This sociability, and its independence from the ties of politics, land tenure, or economics, meant, in Ikegami’s mind, that individuals within Japan were prepared by the late Tokugawa period to see themselves as members of a nation greater than their own local ties, and potential participants in national activities, culture, and history.  They were, then, as she puts it, modern “before modernization.”[6]

In Chapter Two, Ikegami moves from the historical to the theoretical in order to deal with one of the most crucial problems in cultural history: the question of agency in historical change.  This thorny problem is in many ways akin to the question of whether one should vote if one lives in a democratic society, since one vote in the United States, for example, is only one in nearly 75 million eligible to vote, the key is whether that one small voice makes any difference.  In the same way, Ikegami has to deal with agency in both the production and consumption of culture.  Her affinity here with Marx, Habermas, and Hegel is clear.  In order to define culture and cultural consumption as modern or approaching the “Modern”, Ikegami, in her introduction and first chapter invoked the idea of the Tokugawa period as “proto-industrial”.[7] This makes it necessary, and possible, for her to dissect culture in terms of consumption on a Marxist model, which posits that mass culture (i.e. “national culture”) is not possible until a large group of consumers of that culture appear.  The Frankfurt school of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, among others, was admant in the idea that mass culture requires both mass production and mass consumption, and neither of these are possible without the appearance of a bourgeoisie and a proletariat.  The public sphere of Habermas, which Ikegami invokes again in Chapter Two, is closely related to this idea, for it is in the bourgeoisie that Habermas locates the horizontal associations, existing within salons and coffee houses in Europe of the 19th century, which he wants to call the “Public Sphere”, and where free discussions of ideas in multiple areas can create changes in social thinking.[8]

Ikegami makes a direct connection between her own thinking and Habermas here in the process of making her case that a series of social/cultural webs intersect with individual agents and thus mass activity and individual agency are both possible.  In section two, Ikegami sets out to demonstrate the way this intersection works by showing how aesthetic associations acted as essentially horizontal associations that cut across hierarchical status and economic distinctions to create societies within societies, where individual members were parts of separate hierarchies dependent upon their mastery of the aesthetic rather than their lineage, wealth, or political position within the greater community.  Ikegami calls these associations Za, using the Japanese word to pinpoint a social formation whose definition is not easily accessible in English.[9]

In the second section of the book, Ikegami shows how these Za Arts originated with the early Japanese imperial court, where they were not only developed, but became a means of communicating power relations in the earliest of Japanese political systems.  Thus, the context of the appreciation of beauty as a part of a web of social and political relations was established very early.  This provided the background against which a truly proletarian, horizontal development of associations within which individuals could express themselves as equals in the appreciation and execution of aesthetic practice could develop.[10] The development of Za Arts from a formalized court-style ritual which conveyed political power to a set of associational cultural activities in which participation was broad across all levels of Japanese society, though, required several centuries of historical change.  Ikegami begins with a discussion of the development of linked verse (renga) and the way in which its departure both from the locus and the formality of the imperial court in a period of declining court power (the 12th and 13th centuries), along with the rise of the Muromachi Shogunate and the interest in newly powerful samurai in both court and associational culture moved linked verse to a new cultural space – literally a public space – where the limits of power met the limits of social divisions.[11]

The development of za arts in a non-political way in these liminal spaces in medieval Japan made possible the creation of associations in the spirit of ikki – groups of individuals who shared aesthetic and cultural values on an equal footing, regardless of their social or political standing.[12] By the end of section two, Ikegami has shown this pattern of growth of politically and socially neutral cultural spaces to be true for renga, tea ceremony, and popular music in the Medieval period.

What ikegami really wants to get to, however, is the growth of these networks of cultural associations in the Tokugawa period.  She does so in the third section of the work, by noting a few major qualitative changes.

The first of these changes was the rapid growth of four systems of communicative networks that encouraged growing social ties in the seventeenth century.  Those four included the processes of state creation, market-oriented trade systems, commercial publishing, and the growth of aesthetic associational networks.  All of these acted together to create a kind of gestalt in which communication and awareness of cultural, social, and political connections among people at every level of society was on the increase.[13]

The second major change involved the need for the Tokugawa Shogunate to recreate itself as a public organization rather than a private warrior clan.  The creation of this state publicness by the Shogunate led to the development of multiple levels of “publicness” and the arrival of the idea of private space, which was the result of the fact that categorizing public space led to areas of life that were not categorized, in which non-public, unregulated activities could occur.  This private space then became the site of associational groups’, based on aesthetic pursuits, activities and communications.  This is the development of a public sphere ala Habermas, albeit without the overt political element.[14]

In discussing “The Rise of Aesthetic Civility,” and the development of Haikai, Ikegami then brings the reader to her full argument, which is that interest in aesthetic pursuits existed across class boundaries, and in every part of Tokugawa Japan.  Since the interest was there, and such activities existed outside of the formal regulatory system for the most part, such associations tended to cross hierarchical boundaries set up in the political, economic, and social arenas, and made it possible for Japanese to experience each other as different individuals with similar interests.[15] In addition, the long history of aesthetics as important in Japanese politics and social circles tended to reinforce the image of aesthetic pursuits as something intertwined with Japanese identity, despite the de-centralized nature of the political state that the Tokugawa had crafted.

Ultimately, Ikegami wants to present her argument of aesthetic associations as public space a la Habermas for three reasons – first to show the development of a proto-modernity as discussed above.  Second, to broaden the idea of the public sphere beyond the bourgeouis salons of post-Enlightenment Europe and suggest that such associational forms were available in non-European cultures as well, and third, to show that associational developments outside of standard or official spaces for the expression of wealth, power, or identity can exist, and that such spaces have value as challengers to the status quo.


[1] Eiko Ikegami, Bonds of Civility:  Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origins of Japanese Culture, Cambirdge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, 2005), 9.  Here Ikegami states:  “The fact that a plane of commonality evolved primarily within the realm of the beautiful in Tokugawa society, which was otherwise decentralized and divided, holds some suggestive implications for the post-Tokugawa development of the modern Japanese nation-state.”

[2] Ibid., 12-18.

[3] Ibid., 14-15.  Here Ikegami goes briefly into the difference she sees, focusing “on the notion of civility rather than civil society.”

[4] Ikegami, 19-43.

[5] Ibid., 4.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ikegami, 15.

[8] Ibid., 45.

[9] Ibd., 67-76.

[10] Ikegami, 82-83.

[11] Ibid., 90-91.  Here, the terms Ikegami is interested in are kugai and mu’enkugai denoted a “public (but not political) space in the sense of a publicly usable space in a temple, or a market.  Mu’en denoted a kind of topographical/political neutrality, a liminal space where the crossing of borders made redefinition of reality possible.

[12] Ibid., 115.

[13] Ibid., 132.

[14] Ikegami, 134-139.

[15] Ibid., 140-153.

Musings on Japan’s Record Industry

My interest is in the Japanese popular music industry and its early development.  I want to know the way the industry developed sales, marketed music, and developed talent.  At this point in my research, I know that the first gramophones arrived in Japan in the 1890’s, and the first “record players” in about 1905.  By 1920, something called “electronic recording” technology was developing that made songs much easier to listen to because it automated the process, meaning that the old hand-crank system was replaced.  The hand crank had a tendency to be very fast when fully cranked up, then slow down as the spring lost tension.  This, according to 歌の昭和史 led to recordings whose speed and tone were inconsistent.  So electronic recording was a major breakthrough in the industry.There must be some books that give me some chronology on this, and some basic, kind of mechanical history to start with.  I’ll have to look at William Malm.  But also at the history of the American Recording Industry.  Maybe I should start with something about Edison or Menlo Park.

In any case, the first record company in Japan was an indigenous company.  (name?)  They sent their artists to the United States to record, and the discs were mastered and pressed in the United States as well.[1] Victor Japan was opened as a subsidiary of Victor Music Co. in the United States, Victor also sent over a president (Benjamin Gardiner) who began very early to get a feel for the Japanese popular music recording industry, and by 1924 to change it to suit corporate marketing needs.

When he arrived, he found a music industry whose marketing and sales pathways were very similar to those that had developed in the United States in the 1860’s, during the lifetime of the first American popular music composer to actually make a full-time living at his work – Stephen Foster.  In Japan during the last years of the 19th and the first part of the 20th century, music was created by numerous individual composers working for themselves.  They would compose songs, then sell them to publishing houses if they could.  It always helped if the tune had been made popular in a stage drama of some kind, or played in a coffee house or one of the increasing number of night entertainment spots.  If the song sold well as sheet music, after 1914, it might be picked up by a record company and pressed.  The biggest example of this pattern before 1924 was Nakayama Shinpei’s huge hit Kachyusha no uta (Katyusha’s song) which Nakayama had written for Shimamura Hogetsu’s musicalization of Tolstoy’s Resurrection.  Nakayama was, in 1914, a new graduate of the Tokyo Conservatory of Music, and had been houseboy and student of Hogetsu.  He provided the music for Hogetsu’s lyric, designed as part of an attempt to popularize Russian Literature in Japan.  Hogetsu believed that part of the modernization process should include the introduction to common Japanese of Western literature, and he had since 1905, as the new editor of the magazine Waseda Bungaku, set himself the task of doing so by first translating literature from Russian and English, and then setting up a drama organization to present such literature in stage form to draw a less reading public to it.

In any case, Shinpei’s first major song, Kachyusha no uta, also became his first major hit, selling more than 20,000 copies of records, and even more sheet music.  It was the first in a long chain of popular songs about love lost to destiny that have come to be called enka – but it was not the first enka song.

The music we call Enka, developed in the early part of the Meiji period out of several critical influences.  Western music was one, but I don’t want to overemphasize that, because the instrumentation was sometimes used for its portability, and much of the musical structure of songs was changed to suit Japanese tastes and instrumentation, so it is more like parts of Western music were adopted to make Japanese music more universally understandable – more portable – but Japanese music was not changed fundamentally by just this.  Another influence on Enka was the political movement known as the Jiyumin Undo, or the People’s Rights Movement.  This was a politically risky movement of people agitating for a constitution and democracy in Meiji Japan.  Their activities were risky, and in many cases banned outright by the special police law.  So they often turned to street musicians who played short songs and sang politicized protest lyrics, sold the songs as broadsheets, and got away before they could be arrested.  This “music” – it was often little more than a rap or patter, was called Jiyumin Enka for the most part, because it was about the Jiyumin Undo and because the people who performed it were called enkashi because what they performed was engeki – performance.  In other words en (演) ka(歌) shi (氏). I also know that there was at the time a general attempt in many ways at leveling Japanese social and economic differences, and reducing the hierarchy as it had existed in the Tokugawa period.  This was the point of the destruction of the Samurai Class.  In line with this, merchants and wealthy farm and artisanal families – those who could afford to, had by the end of the Tokugawa Period, and certainly into early Meiji, begun taking on the trappings of what we might call middle class life.  Part of that was entering the musical traditions of their previous social superiors – the samurai and court nobles.  So while these middle class families were buying and educating their children in the use of pianos from the west, they were also buying and teaching their children to play koto and shamisen, for example, from the samurai and court classes.  So enka was product of exoticization and appropriation of domestic as well as foreign traditions, and mixing them together with the traditions and styles of the new middle class in the Meiji Period.

After the 1890 constitution was promulgated.  the Jiyuminken Undo lost steam, but the need for enkashi to make a living still continued, and many turned to singing less political songs, with themes of love, loss, and duty, but with the same instrumentation and musical styles as they had used for the more political songs.


[1] 歌の昭和史

Camptown Races and the Boatman’s Song: Popular Song and National Belonging in Japan and America

– By Patrick M. Patterson

I began this project as a way to look more thoroughly at the subject of my dissertation: a composer of popular music in Japan after 1912.  I had become so narrowly focused on the cultural and economic context of popular music creation and distribution in pre-World War II Japan that I felt I needed to place my ideas, and “my composer” in a global context and see if anything that I was thinking about was reflective of larger trends in History and the study of popular culture.  One of my axioms as I worked through my research has been the idea of Stuart Hall, reflected by John Storey and other authors, that mass culture, national trends, and marketable popularity developed as an integral part of industrial technology, transportation, and distribution infrastructure in industrializing nations.  I was pleased to find, then, that a comparison of two composers, my own Nakayama Shimpei of Japan, and the United States’ Stephen Foster, whom I chose at random as someone with superficial similarities to Nakayama, for which comparison might be useful, seems to bear this idea out.

As Stephen Collins Foster lay dying at Bellevue Hospital in New York in 1864, both Japan and the United States were entering periods of transformational social conflict. In the United States, the Civil War and, in Japan the Meiji Restoration were both about defining what the modern nation was, who it would include, and how it would include them. Stephen Foster (b.1827, d. 1864), and Nakayama Shimpei (b. 1887, d. 1967), played important roles in the cultural transformations of their respective nations as they redefined themselves and created new national identities out of diverse local cultures.

Stephen Collins Foster was born on July 4, 1827, youngest of nine children in a well-to-do middle class family in the greater Pittsburgh area of Pennsylvania. At the time of his birth, Stephen’s father William was a successful real-estate speculator and Democratic Party politician. His mother was every bit the well-to-do socialite in an up-and-coming new industrial center. The family lived in a suburban home on a large plot of land that was part of the property Foster had developed, and Mrs. Foster had named the place “The White Cottage.”  For for Stephen, this was always home – the place where all good things were to be found – a kind of Xanadu that was lost and never regained when, the year after Stephen’s birth, his father lost the home and all his property in a loan foreclosure.

Growing up in Pittsburgh, Stephen Foster displayed creativity with music at a young age.  By the time he was 17, he was writing tunes in the style of popular English parlor songs, and setting poetry to music, as happened with “Open Thy Lattice, Love” the first extant song composed by Stephen Foster, published in 1844.[1] Even as early as age nine, Stephen and his friends put on shows that mimicked the popular “black-face” minstrel acts of the day.[2] Stephen’s act was, according to his brother Morrison, so popular that he became the only one in the group to perform in every show, and was paid a percentage of the box office take.[3] He also wrote some of the music for these shows, and became as adept at writing black face songs as he was as writing parlor songs. He is said to have been an accomplished player of several musical instruments, and is supposed to have studied classical music on his own.

In 1848 he wrote “Oh, Susanna,” a song destined to become one of the most popular songs in world history up to that point. In the 1850’s, signing several exclusive contracts with his music publisher, Stephen Foster became the first composer of popular music in American history to make his living exclusively from that work.  He also became the man who introduced African-American and slave culture, however superficial and stereotyped, to white Americans in the northern industrial cities.

Like Stephen Foster, many of Nakayama Shimpei’s more than 300 songs are so well known in Japan today that they have become a part of the cultural fabric of Japan, sung by all, though few know who first created them.  Children in kindergarten learn many of Nakayama’s simple songs, and they are called home from play in the evening by the local fire station loudspeakers broadcasting perhaps his most famous: Yūyake koyake.

Shimpei was born to a large family on March 22, 1887, in what is currently Nakamura-city, in Nagano Prefecture.[4] He was the fourth surviving child. When Shimpei was in second grade, he began to learn to play a “baby organ”.[5] In his diary he says that this “was just at the time the Sino-Japanese war began, so we played epic energetic military marches and sang our young hearts out.”[6] In school, he did especially well in music and physical education.[7] In 1905, at age 18, he decided to go to college in Tokyo and become a music teacher.[8]

Shimpei’s journey to Tokyo began in the company of a friend who had enlisted in the army on his way to Nagano city.[9] Stopping at Takazaki, a city along the way, Shimpei wrote in his diary about seeing soldiers.  He went to the gates of the training grounds to watch recruits being put through their paces, and was moved by their commitment to protect the nation.[10] What is important about this episode is that it fits with the interest Nakayama was to continue to display in Japanese identity.  During his life, he regularly toured Japan and wrote songs based on his experiences about Japanese people and Japanese places.

It is this sense of national identity with which both Foster and Nakayama worked that is the focus of my interest. Stephen Foster’s songs were created in the ten years prior to the start of the Civil War in the United States. This period saw an America trying to define itself. It was a nation built on business and entrepreneurship, and the freedom of personal action which supposedly encouraged businesses to take root and grow. Still, the business of America remained agriculture, and the laborers in agricultural areas included large numbers of slaves. The tension between freedom and slavery, opportunity and bankruptcy were probably easily detected everywhere. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin was known to Foster, and, his notes show that he began what was to become “My Old Kentucky Home” with that book in mind.[11] The Underground Railroad was already a fact of American life. Yet white people, abolitionists, northern industrialists and laborers, and even slave owners, did not know much about black culture, language, or thought, and assumed blacks to all be inferior in every way. The introduction of southern culture, and slave culture, along with the culture of the West, provided Americans with the imagined elements of their society, and allowed them to begin forming a new image of what it meant to be American that included at least some of African American culture. Stephen Foster’s songs show this, too. His stereotyped, caricatured protagonists cannot pronounce English except in a faux southern twang with a speech impediment thrown in to boot, his black face protagonists are all from the margins of American society.  His music, taken as a whole, encompasses the subduction of the American Frontier, and the American South, into the mainstream of American culture. His popular songs were a necessary voice within the nation, helping people to define and redefine themselves based on the new concept of identities.  He was not alone in this, but was influenced by abolitionists (though there is no evidence that he was one) in the idea that slaves were unhappy and appears to have believed that he could turn his blackface music into something respectable to the white, middle class theater going audience without removing the elements that made it exotic.[12] Foster’s songs did bring stereotyped images of American blacks to popular music and the theater, but he knew the music he was imitating, and this combination of imitation and ridicule was able to bring the problems of blacks, and the appeal of a new kind of music, to the attention of North Eastern middle class white society, however subconscious and derogatory his songs might otherwise be.[13]

So one of Foster’s greatest contributions is as the beginning of the influence of the music of African Americans on popular music.[14] In a way, as William W. Austin has noted, this, like Beethoven and his use of the waltz, is really the “adoption of a new, foreign rhythm” that creates a new fashion, but the “foreign rhythm” came from within the United States, and could be claimed as part of American culture in a growing nation, just as performers often claimed Foster’s songs as their own.[15]

Nakayama Shimpei was born into a similar situation, albeit after Japan’s civil war, and well into the twentieth century. Still, it was in the Meiji era, from 1868 to 1912, that Japan underwent its first great, and very sudden, wave of industrialization. Japan by 1914, the year of Shimpei’s debut on the stage as a composer, and the production of his first hit song, had undergone in only 50 years an industrial revolution that had taken 120 years in the United States, and had reached a rough technological parity with American corporations. The wrenching changes that accompany a society through an industrial revolution in terms of relocation of labor, issues of management, reformation of the class structure, conversion to wage work, etc. were causing tremendous change and pain throughout Japan.

One of the most important changes to occur was a new sense of Japan as a nation that was coming to be held by those at all levels of the class structure.  This had been encouraged with the Meiji Government’s abolition of the Samurai caste, which tended to make the Emperor the center, and level the social playing field.[16] It required more factory workers, and often located factories near the farming communities where laborers lived in the off-season. It required workers of all types to move into the larger cities such as Osaka, Tokyo, Fukushima, and Sendai, to name only a few. These workers needed places to stay, and felt foreign in the cities. They tended to settle, in neighborhoods that were made up of others from near their native place. These local laborer and business communities attempted to maintain their own cultural traditions, even performing local folk, songs.[17] Like the United States, though without the slaves, the new nation of Japan came to be made up as much of people from the periphery of society – farmers, laborers, women – as it was by the central powers of government, the bureaucratic class and the educated elite. It was, like Foster, these people to whom Nakayama Shimpei turned for his inspiration, and for his market.

Nakayama Shimpei’s first popular song, Kachushya no uta, or Katchusha’s Song, came from a Western musical tradition, and was created as a part of a musical production based on Tolstoy’s novel Resurrection.[18] This “musicalization” of a Western novel gave Shimpei the opportunity to customize Western music to suit a Japanese audience.  The result of his hybridization was a song that was, like Foster’s “Ethiopian Songs,” the “adoption of a new, foreign rhythm” that creates a new fashion, and this fashion was the most popular song in Japanese history to that point.

A large part of Nakayama’s success in the music industry, came after the publication and recording of “Boatman’s Song” (Sendo kouta), produced in 1922, which remained at the top of Japanese popular music sales into the 1930’s.[19] Nakayama’s success with Sendo kouta, and in blending Western and Japanese musical styles, and the effectiveness of the lyrics of his collaborators led to a new style of popular music, called shin-minyo (New Folk Songs).[20] Shin-minyo was intended by its creators to be directly related to the Folk songs of Tokugawa era villages in style and content.  In 1924, Nakayama produced the most popular song of this new genre, Suzaka kouta.[21] The twist on this was that Suzaka kouta was written on commission for a country onsen spa, and was specifically designed to promote tourism to the resort, but was sold to the market as a popular song in the style of local folk music. This irony was a central part of shin-minyo, however, very much like the irony of Stephen Foster’s use in his black-face minstrel music of stereotypes and caricatures of black speech and slave life, Shin minyo targeted middle class city folk while staking a claim to legitimacy as country folk songs.

The final comparison I want to make has to do with the modernization of music distribution systems.  In Stephen Foster’s time, music was printed and distributed by a growing group of professional music publishing houses.   One of the skills that Foster had to learn was how to negotiate contracts with these firms, and how to keep them using his music without paying him.[22] The difficulty in doing this was related to the lack of copyright laws, and the difficulties involved in monitoring a new capitalist distribution system with pre-modern technology.  Foster, for example, never had a means by which he could independently verify the number of sheets of a particular song a publisher had sold, and so had no way to verify that he was being fairly paid.  He was, however, the first American to become a full time composer of popular songs.[23] The music publishing and distribution system of the United States’ growing economy played a large role in this, making his songs available in sufficient quantities and at sufficiently low cost that Foster could survive for fourteen years without a separate “day job” as it were.

In a similar way, though later and with different technology, the music industry of newly industrialized Japan made Nakayama Shimpei wealthy and famous.  The new technology in the industry in Nakayama’s lifetime was the record player.  Its role in his popularity and wealth was central.  In 1928, for example, Nakayama and Noguchi produced Habu no Minato (The Harbor of Habu) for sheet music publication, and performance.  The song was soon recorded, and record production could not keep up with sales.[24] Inspired by this, Nippon Polydor executives created the first popular song to be produced from the beginning as a song for recording, rather than as a popular song picked up after performances from sheet music made it a hit.  This song, Kimi Koishi (You, Sweetheart), was designed, as critics of pop music today lament regularly, to be innocuous, less depressing, less reflective of the times, than earlier songs.  A love song, it hit the market with a splash, and the market never looked back. Most Japanese record companies adopted the new policy of the President of Nippon Victor, American Benjamin Gardner, who began using the American marketing style where record companies designed and manufactured hits for the market, becoming part of the productive process, rather than simply distributors of products.[25] As with Foster, new technology in production and distribution of popular music was the primary means by which Shimpei came to have such a large impact on Japan’s modern culture.

It seems to me that an analysis of the development of mass culture and the music industry in any culture can benefit from a comparative approach.  My own look here at Japan and the United States has found each at the edge of its industrial revolution, and has been, I think, able to place the development of popular music within that phase of national history as an integral part of the development of a national market, a national identity, and a mass culture industry.  I find it fascinating that, 60 years apart, both Foster and Nakayama wrote songs for a new nation that became popular because of new capabilities in national distribution and sales.  In many ways, this comparison seems to bear out the ideas of Stuart Hall and other analysts of popular culture that popular culture is an integral part of an industrial infrastructure.  At this point in my own work, this comparison has given me the opportunity to think more about the development of a global mass culture within a global context of industrialization.  It seems helpful to me to know that Shimpei’s experience did not occur in a vacuum, but was related in real ways to the experiences of others like Stephen Foster in other developing nations.


[1] Charles E. Hamm, Yesterdays: popular song in America, (New York: Norton, 1979), 204.

[2] Ibid., 207.

[3] William W. Austin, “Susanna,” “Jeanie,” and “The Old Folks At Home”: The Songs of Stephen C. Foster from His Time to Ours, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1975, reprint 1987), 7.

[4]Nakayama, Urō.  Nakayama Shimpei sakyoku kokuroku nenpyo [中山晋平 作曲刻六年表] (Nakayama Shimpei: A Chronology of a composer, 1980), 287.

[5] Nakayama, 287.  According to the Nakano City history, a baby organ was provided for the Hino Elementary School in March of Meiji 26.  It is unclear of this is the same organ mentioned above.

[6] Nakayama, 289.

[7] Ibid., 289.

[8] Ibid., 291.

[9] Ibid., 291.

[10] Ibid., 292.

[11] Hamm, 215; Austin, 189.

[12] Ken Emerson, Doo-dah!: Stephen Foster and the Rise of American Popular Culture (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 183.

[13] Austin, v.

[14] Austin, v.

[15] Austin, xxii.

[16] Irokawa Daikichi, The Culture of the Meiji Period, 35, 36.  Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1985) 9.

[17] Irokawa Daikichi, The Culture of the Meiji Period, ed. Marius Jansen (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1985) 35, 36.

[18] Nakayama, 302.

[19] Ishikawa Hiroyoshi, Gouraku no senzenshi (A History of Prewar Entertainment Culture), (Tokyo:  Toshosensho, 1981),  73; Nakamura Toyo, “Early pop song writers and their backgrounds” in Popular Music, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Cambridge, England:  Cambridge University Press, 1991), 266.

[20] Nakayama, 287.

[21] Nakayama, 287.

[22] Emerson, 175-183.

[23] Hamm, 224-227.

[24] Nakamura, 267-268.

[25] Ibid. Nippon Polydor, along with Nippon Victor, were formed in the mid 1920’s to capitalize on increasing music sales in Japan.  The parent company of Nippon Polydor was Deutsche Polydor, which owned its Japanese subsidiary fully.

Rostow: *The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-Communist Manifesto*

Rostow, W. W. The Stages of Economic Growth, a Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 1960.

Walt Whitman Rostow’s book The Stages of Economic Growth provides a systematic theoretical approach to economic development that is every bit the “non-communist manifesto” that he promises in his subtitle.  Rostow’s work would seem to be foundational to modernization theory and contemporary conservative American views of economics.  Rostow’s primary thesis is that economies grow in developmental stages.  These stages occur in a specific order, and that order operates in only one direction.  The stages begin with “traditional society,” then “preconditions for take-off,” “take-off,” “economic maturity,” and finally “mass consumption.”  For Rostow, this is a linear progressive system, though he claims no Hegelian influence, and rejects the Marxist idea of dialectical progress outright.  This system of economic development is, Rostow claims, a categorization, and so does not claim universal truth, nor does every economy fit perfectly within it.  Still, Rostow’s system is teleological.  It is based on the assumption that, like Francis Fukuyama would later claim for the American system of democratic government, American Capitalism is the highest achievement in human economic history – not perfect, but the most fair, most efficient, and most flexible system for wealth distribution yet devised by human kind.  In this sense, Rostow’s claims are compelling, but logically at times contradictory, at other times circular.  I found Rostow to be a fascinating read, and found more in it that helps me understand current and recent economic thinking among Americans than theory that reflects economic reality.  Rostow, though, despite his disclaimers, seems to see his theory not as theory, but as a series of categories and historical stages that are more real than those proposed by Karl Marx.

Rostow begins his book with an introduction that seems intended both to give his thesis – that economies all operate according to the stages he has proposed – and to make a disclaimer that he is not actually trying to encompass all economic details within his stages, only to propose general categories.  The categories he proposes, though, remind me very much of two traditions of thought in other fields, and I wonder about his relation to those fields.  He clearly had read widely and well.  The first connection that came to my mind was the work of V. Gordon Childe, whose work in the 1930’s formed the foundation for anthropological theories of the stages of development for human society, beginning with hunter-gatherer society and moving through agriculture, civilization, empire, etc…  It seems clear to me that Rostow’s work owes some debt, direct or indirect, to Childe.  But it is also clear that Rostow is an early proponent of Modernization Theory, which as I understand it was an intellectual movement developed in the late 1950’s and 1960’s (during the early Cold War) in opposition to Marxist theories of economic and historical development.  Where Marxists see historical development as happening through a dialectic of class struggle, the end of which is the final competition between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the teleology of Modernization Theory is that the ultimate development of human society is democracy and capitalism as embodied in the United States at the end of World War II.  Modernizationists have been as guilty as Marxists of over-theorizing history to make it fit within their teleological position, and I think Rostow certainly goes that route – though, like most Marxists and Modernizationists, not without some value added along the way.

The first stage that Rostow proposes is the so-called “traditional society” in which wealth is based on agricultural production, and in which most wealth ends up in the hands of a non-productive elite, thus, in Rostow’s terminology, providing minimal capital for the compounding of interest (his term for linear progressive development, taken from the lexicon of financial traders’ and economists’ discourse on the way money grows in a capitalist system).  Because in a traditional society most of the people who end up with wealth use it to consume (luxuries, non-productive service labor, etc) rather than invest it in order to produce, traditional society is very inefficient, progresses very slowly, and has a deep gap between wealthy and non-wealthy.

The first real stage of growth toward capitalism, Rostow says, is his stage two – the preconditions for economic take-off.  In an interesting way, this is a progressive concept that is named in a regressive way – that is, the name reveals the essential teleology of the entire system.  Rostow assumes that economies will reach a stage he calls economic take-off, and so looking backward they must go through this stage of creating the preconditions for that take-off.  This stage depends on the existence of the next stage, which is, ironically, dependent upon the existence of this stage.  Circular logic.

In any case, the preconditions for take-off are, according to Rostow, found in economic, social, political, and even religious sectors of traditional societies.  Since, Rostow acknowledges, traditional societies are not immune from change, but are, in fact fluid entities (nonetheless, throughout the book he sets them up as a straw man to be knocked down by the essential fact of change in modern (read ‘capitalist’) societies).  That fluidity leads to natural changes, and contact with societies already in the process of take-off or maturity can accelerate those changes.  The changes he refers to are a kind of gestalt that must include the growth of a “modern” financial system that begins the process of funneling wealth into more productive hands – those who will spend or lend for productive activities, rather than hoard or spend on consumables.  He also sees a need for a society to lose some traditions, and reinforce others such that the accumulation of wealth is considered an acceptable alternative way to gain power and prestige in society, thus making productive economic activity an attractive idea.

*Rickshaw Beijing*: A Short Synopsis

Strand, David.  Rickshaw Beijing:  City People and Politics in the 1920’s.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

In Rickshaw Beijing David Strand takes a unique approach to the history of Beijing during the 1920’s.  Although technically this book is a micro-history, Strand’s subject is extremely complex, and the lens he uses is wide-angle, broadening the view of Beijing as well as deepening it. Beginning with the Rickshaw pullers of Beijing, Strand gradually broadens his focus to include their customers, the police who regulated their activities, the Chamber of Commerce, which acted as an intermediary between citizens and government, warlords and presidents, and even Chiang Kai-shek.  By the end, Strand has led readers through a history of Beijing that takes account of the laboring poor and puts them into a society that includes a complicated mix of social classes and “vertical affinities.”  His view seems to be that the society of Beijing was developing a “public sphere”, both in the sense of Habermas’ discursive concept, and in the way that city planners think of public space.  This hybrid public-discussion-on-the-streets-of-Beijing, in Strand’s narrative, seems to lead to the potential for a political discussion that is chaotic and broad-based yet ultimately brings effective, if not efficient, local politics in a national vacuum.  Strand uses beautiful prose and a gift for story telling to provide readers with an empirical set of studies that de-emphasizes the national events and questions of Republican China, and puts the society of Beijing on stage.

Outline of Strand: *Rickshaw Beijing*

Strand, David.  Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920’s. Berkeley, Los

Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1989.

  1. A Twentieth Century Walled City   p.1
    1. Beijing – physical change was part of the old imperial city -changes coexisted in an ambiguous physical relationship between present and past.
    2. Beijing and Beiping:  Taking the Measure of a Capital in Decline

i.      Imperial center ceased to be used after 1911 Revolution, and Beijing became a de-centered political center which eventually only controlled itself.

ii.      Exit of Zhang Zuolin left Beijing to Nationalists, whose capital was in Nanjing, so Beijing (Northern Capital) became Beiping (Northern Peace).  Further de-centering politics, the city remained important.

iii.      Local residents had a difficult time – they thought of Beijing as the capital, and, as Strand says, were used to thinking of national politics as local business.  The Nationalists (Chiang Kai-shek) were adamant about the capital in Nanjing.

iv.      Still, the possibility of an eventual national gov’t made Beijing the site of officials, non-functional ministries, etc., all awaiting the chance to be part of the next government.

v.      The decline of Manchus in Beijing, and their willingness to take low-paying jobs to pay the rent, etc, led to a poor reputation, which happened to parallel the decline of the Nationalist regime, thus giving Beijing an air of a derelict capital unable to recover.

    1. Local Politics in a Centerless Polity

i.      Under a façade of romantic antiquity, decay, and modern decline, Beijing was vital and complex – excellent police force, energetic journalistic world, Beidai had the best minds in China despite poor pay, busy market, guilds, labor unions, etc…

ii.      Beijing as empty center is in a way emblematic of the empty center of China itself, with warlordism, false democracies, bribery to earn elected office, etc. . .  the change from central authority to the chaotic idea of “will of the people” caused a cultural crisis.

iii.      The very organizational level of the bureaucracies that did work heightened this cultural crisis.  In a way, “hollow” Beijing began to regulate itself.

iv.      “City residents experienced politics as a path that began within their immediate world of shop, school, or neighborhood, and spiraled up through guilds, unions, associations, federations, and chambers.  Beyond organizations operating at the citywide level lay the uncertainties, dangers, and opportunities of regional, national, and international politics” p. 19 – Habermas’ “Public Sphere”

  1. The Rickshaw:  Machine for a Mixed Up Age  p.20
    1. Beijing was awash with rickshaw pullers – the case of the story of ‘Camel’ Xiangzi by Lao She illustrates the pervasiveness of rickshaw pullers, and their image as being present in the making of history in Republican Beijing.
    2. The Rickshaw as a Modern Invention

i.      Invented in Japan in 1860’s, technical improvements quickly made the Rickshaw light & useful, and pervasive in East Asia and India.  In 1940’s pedals and front wheel added to make the pedicab.

ii.      Initially, disliked because they were seen as reducing humans to the level of animals – which were the only other transportation in Beijing after 1886.

iii.      Initially unpopular, before and after the Boxer Rebellion, their numbers grew until in the 1920’s there were 60,000 rickshaw pullers in Beijing.

iv.      Part of the speed up of transportation in the city, like telegraphs, etc.

    1. Passengers

i.      For most Beijing residents, walking was the way to move, esp. those who were laborers

ii.      This, combined with the time- and comfort-saving nature of the rickshaw made it a status symbol for its riders.

    1. Pullers

i.      Pullers came mostly from the lower parts of the working class.  The job offered a place for immigrants and upwardly mobile workers, and a “liferaft” for those out of work or on their way down. (p.33)\

ii.      Rickshaw pullers caused difficulties for upper class and intellectuals partly because the work was demeaning, and partly because it was a reminder of the transitory nature of status and status distinctions. (p. 33)

iii.      Rickshaw pullers’ image as beasts of burden highlighted the social dysfunction and transition period of Republican Beijing, making moral dilemmas and the challenges of modernization clear. (p. 35)

iv.      Strand’s strategy is to place Rickshaw men at the center of his look at Beijing, and to use this as an entry point for his research.

  1. Rickshaw Men:  Careers of the Laboring Poor  p. 38
    1. Earning a living on the street (Lao She’s fictional character and a real puller named Yao Yingrui who tried to commit suicide) p. 43.
    2. Courtyard Slums – the residences of pullers, lower class residences in courtyard tenements – rooms meant to be part of a larger house, where whole families lived on limited income. (p.43) But these did not develop into working class neighborhoods, as they were scattered about the city, and often status between courtyards was intense, preventing larger politico-social groupings.
    3. Owners and Renters

i.      A patron-client relationship developed among rickshaw garages and pullers.  This was a porous division, in which pullers were responsible to the garages, but also their clients.  Garages also did not have high social status.  Market forces in the 1920’s worked so that garages charged different rents, and pullers often shopped around, though some preferred the security of a regular relationship.

    1. Street-level Perspectives on Power and Status

i.      Difference in class between puller and passenger

1.      led to cheating on both sides, and rickshaw man had to enforce fare payment with fists if necessary

2.      differences in dress

3.      Fares negotiated in public, along with other street-sellers, and fares might change after the ride was over.

4.      Deceit and bad faith on both sides.  Rickshaw men were seen as capable of cheating, etc., but were often cheated themselves. (p. 53)

5.      police and rickshaw pullers had a paralel development, and a relationship that was alternately adversarial and cooperative. 54.

6.      rickshaw men – in tenements, lower class, etc, oftsn found selves without power.

ii.      Men Without Power (p.56)

1.      Habermas style, rickshaw men formed assistance groups, helped each other, learned law, and protected themselves – very much public sphere.

2.      Collective Action:  Premonitions And Precedents

3.      willingness to fight ad occasional group solidarity meant they could “overcome an [equally] well documented reputation for powerlessness and vulnerability.

4.      Beijing – slow to act and organize.

5.      low rents dampened conflicts between owners and pullers – (p.61)

  1. Policemen as Mediators and Street-Level Bureaucrats  p. 65
    1. For Rickshaw men, the government was represented most clearly by the police, with whom they dealt on a regular basis.
    2. The police were organized according to the regular organizational units of Beijing – Banner and non-banner, inner and prefecture, etc…
    3. Policing in Beijing changed after the Boxer Rebellion – Kawashima,  Japanese expert on policing, set up a police academy in the Japanese-controlled section of Beijing, which was taken over by his Chinese patron, Prince Su, after Japan left Beijing, and the Japanese faculty maintained.  The Beijing police became a single unit responsible for the city using modern police methods, and inspired police reform around China.
    4. The police were so well organized that their effectiveness and size grew throughout the early twentieth century until Beijing’s reputation was as “one of the best-policed cities in the world” (p.71) Despite protests from magistrates who felt their authority usurped, etc, and the police survived the 1911 revolution, and other events prior to WWII that shook China.
    5. Recruitment and Deployment (p. 73)

i.      By 1911, 12 policemen for every 1,000 residents.

ii.      Like Meiji Japan, most of Beijing’s early policement were ex-bannermen (Manchus).

iii.      Large numbers on the streets, stationed at well-placed positions.

    1. Police rhetoric and practice (p.73)

i.      This closeness to population was a “redrawing of the boundary line between state and society.  Police joining the Public Sphere in formerly private/hidden Beijing.

ii.      Rather than jail miscreants, police were supposed to anticipated problems and nip them in the bud – their goal was to prevent crime by acting as mediators and representatives of order. (p.75-77)

    1. Paternalism, Patriarchy, and the Boundaries of Policed Society (p. 83)

i.      “The police patrolled the public realm between official and private affairs” (p. 87)

    1. Beijing Police Rhetoric and Ideology in Comparative Perspective (p.89)

i.      Beijing police as both modern, and informed by a Chinese Confucian morality that accepted deviance as an inevitable undercurrent of society,  and believed that consensus was possible even in chaotic times. “Enforce the law except when it conflicts with or is overridden by customary practice” (p.91)

    1. Repression and Mediation (p. 92)

i.      Political activists and police control of their activities (p.93)

ii.      Police “field of control” centered in Beijing’s streets and public places (pg.94)

    1. Paying the Price of Bureacratic Expansion (p. 95)

i.      Expansion of Yamen runners into formal police at level of Bureaucrats with salaries was a “bold and expensive stroke” that made for a professional force, but also caused problems paying them, which were constantly shifted as the Republic shifted. (p. 95-97)

  1. Jeweler, Banker, and Restaurateur:  Power Struggles in the Beijing Chamber of Commerce  p. 98
    1. In the absence of elected city government, private organizations came to represent people and take part in discussions of policy.  The Chamber of commerce and other non-official organizations were an avatar for politics “in the same way that the Beijing police came to be an avatar for government.” (p. 99)
    2. The Origins of the Beijing Chamber (p. 99)

i.      1907 Beijing Chamber organized amid a rash of development of chambers in imitation of Shanghai chamber.  The Qing gov’t hoped to help business elites identify their interests with those of the Imperial government and improve economy.

ii.      Within a year of founding, the construction of an official headquarters was seen as a move toward legitimate PUBLIC support and position. (as opposed to private and official)(p.101)

iii.      All over, chambers of commerce played semi-official roles during and after the 1911 revolution.  Still, most fatuan had an ambiguous relationship with power – they became more independent, but not officially powerful.

    1. The Rise and Fall of An Disheng (p. 102)

i.      Before 1920’s, Chamber had passive dependent relationship with authority.(p.102)

ii.      An Disheng strengthened the Chamber by making merchants active in

1.      protesting Republic (Yuan Shikai) policies that caused money market and banking chaos – lobbying for fiscal responsibility, which was in their interests.

2.      Participating in the May 4th movement and nationalism to promote international trade

iii.      One month after his second term, in 1920, he was arrested for misappropriation of funds – he had angered power people in the Anfu-clique.  Bankers were angry because his protest of fiscal policies had caused them problems (they profited from the fiscal chaos of the Republican government) and the May 4th movement villainized members of the Anfu-clique.

    1. A Banker’s Chamber (p.113)

i.      Public rivalry between An Disheng and Zhuo Zuomin

    1. Sun Xueshi and the Realm of Social Intercourse (p. 116)

i.      Sun was a master of social discourse and informal networks – this was the source of his power in the Brothel District, and in the chamber. (p. 117)

    1. One Year of Unopposed Leadership (p. 119)
  1. Profits and People’s Livelihood:  The Politics of Streetcar Development  p. 121
    1. Local Reaction to Technological Change (p. 121)

i.      The streetcar as new linear technology caused uproar, and was incongruous in a preindustrial city.  This caused debate and discussion. (p. 121)

ii.      The key controversy was not modern vs. tradition, or safety, or such, but the possibility of depriving rickshaw pullers of their jobs. (p. 122)

    1. The Founding of the Beijing Streetcar Company (p. 123)

i.      Owned by French BIC, and Chinese investors, then by the French themselves, the Streetcar company was controversial from the ownership/finace perspective (France and already wealthy Chinese owned the shares) and from a business standpoint, and from the standpoint of rickshaw pullers who feared losing their business. (127)

    1. The Politics of People’s Livelihood (p. 127)

i.      Antagonism felt in the Chamber of Commerce toward some of the businessmen who owned shares encouraged the Chamber to voice its sympathy for the Rickshaw pullers in 1922. (p. 128-129)

    1. Streetcar Beijing (134)

i.      The competition between street car and rickshaw was an economic “public sphere” in which the ideas of economic modernization, class and economics, and market advantages were negotiated. (p. 138-9)

  1. Bosses, Guilds, and Work Gangs:  Labor Politics and the Sprouts of Unionism  p. 142
    1. Proletarian Politics in a Preindustrial City (p. 142)

i.      Deng Zhongxia and other Beidai students tried to organize rickshaw pullers and other workers in Beijing with little luck

1.      Beijing society was more vertically divided than horizontally.

2.      Efficient police force and self-government made inroads into that society difficult.

3.      Beidai students were of a different class than the workers. (146-7)

    1. Guilds and Worker Interests (p. 147)
    2. Feuds, Fights, and Factions (p.150)

i.      Patron-client relationships in guilds defied the easy class categories.  Subordination in a hierarchy was normal, but workers were also protected by the hierarchy. (150)

ii.      Opinion among workers that city-wide organization along traditional lines was worthwhile (151-2)

iii.      Internal fighting within guilds and external participation in politics (154)

1.      Guild creation represented “state-building in miniature” (p. 154) – contentious, etc.  [puclic sphere]

    1. The Sprouts of Unionism (p. 163)
  1. Citizens in a New Public Sphere:  Widening Circles of Political Participation  p.  167
    1. Assemblies of Citizens (p. 172)

i.      No tradition of political debate among citizens of towns, but widespread preindustrial participation in associations, guilds, organizations, theaters, etc., predisposed Beijing citizens to public debate, and such associations took their issues into the public in competition with each other. (174-175)

ii.      May 4th Solidified the above, and made the commitment of students seem heroic. (175)

iii.      The fact that citizens could not easily access high power due to bribery, corruption, and exclusivism, meant that local politics became their domain, and that reinforced association style public discourse.

iv.      Improvised citizens assemblies to discuss Shandong concessions throughout the country.

    1. Self-Government (p. 178)

i.      Local self-government was encouraged, and in various meanings, self-government groups. (179)

ii.      Like associations, these groups tended to represent a particular interest or strata (180)

    1. The May Thirtieth Movement (p. 182)

i.      May 30, 1925 nationwide protests against police and foreign violence against protesting Chinese.

ii.      The working out of the national Public Sphere conversation – “mass nationalism” (183)

    1. Professional Politicians and Political Violence (p. 191)

i.      Nationalist and communist political operatives aimed to become guides, rather than just examples as students were. (191)

ii.      Parties were split, but May Thirtieth Movement gave them impetus (193)

iii.      Professional politicians’ use, then abuse of demonstrations and violence led to escalation and the destruction of the public sphere. (195)

  1. City People Under Seige:  The Impact of Warlordism  p.198
    1. City Under Seige (p. 199)

i.      1925-26 warlord infighting – Zhang Zuolin and Feng Yuxian led to more war-consciousness than ever, as escalating violence in the city also led to a siege mentality, rising prices,. (204)

ii.      Most warlord wars fought along rail lines vital to city supplies, furthering sense of siege.

iii.      Formation and support of  Metropolitan Peace Preservation Association (PPA) to alleviate difficulties and high prices, became a new public sphere for self-help in Beijing and negotiations with warlords. PPA became a de-facto government and defense association for Beijing. (203-216)

iv.      PPA establishes control of police (211)

    1. Managing Protection Costs (p. 216)
  1. Union and Faction:  Organized Labor in the Wake of the Northern Expedition  p. 222
    1. Cadres (p. 224)
    2. Unionism (p. 227)
    3. Rebellion in the Ranks (p. 231)
    4. Factionalism (p. 238)
  2. Machine-Breakers:  The Streetcar Riot of October 22, 1929  p. 241
    1. Unions and Crowds (p. 242)
    2. Political Consciousness and Class Consciousness (p. 251)
    3. Prelude to Riot (p.261)
    4. Riot (p. 267)
    5. Conclusion (p. 279)
  3. Order and Movement in City Politics  p. 284
    1. Displaced Development (284)
    2. Politics on the Defensive (288)
    3. Conflict and Cohesion as a Continuous Process (290)

Outline of Weston: *The Power of Position*

Weston, Timothy B.  The Power of Position:  Beijing University, intellectuals, and Chinese Political Culture, 1898-1929. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2004.

I.   Introduction:

a.       Four major contentions:

i.      Beijing U. early history is a perfect space in which to study the way in which humanistic intellectuals
repositioned themselves in chaos, change, etc… (p. 8)

ii.     “the complexity of Beida’s early history has been obscured by the historiography on the
May 4th Movement.” (8)

iii.      Better to study Chinese intellectuals in a broad context, including not only ideas, but social
and institutional history as well.

iv.      Local cultural and social characteristics need to be understood and worked into the history
of intellectuals.

II.    Schools, Politics, and Reform in the Nineteenth Century

a.       Beida has existed since 1898 as a point of contact between state and society. (As Jingshi daxuetang)

b.      The choice to follow Meiji Japan’s example in establishing Beida was a clear choice of modernity.

i.      linking the new U. with wealth and prosperity encouraged conservatives

ii.      In the Qing, access to power was gained through educational achievements. (14)

iii.      For intellectuals in the late Qing/early republic, the chaos, penetration of upper class by merchants,
etc., led to an idealized vision of a China “in which “true” men of learning possessed the highest
social status” (p. 23)

iv.      Huan Zongxi – revitalize politics by revitalizing education, as schools were centers of community
and state activities (p.24)

v.      Reformers still thought that reform could only work best in a completely new institution. (26) & were
heavily influenced by the establishment of Todai in Japan (25).  This blend of conservative thought
and radical action is interesting.

vi.      The First head of the University, Sun Jai’tai, as also in effect “minister of education” for the entire
empire. (34)

vii.      The Jingshi daxuetang survived the 1898 coup by Cixi, but taught only the five classics, and then
was closed down.

III.

IV.   Conclusions

a.       This was a study of how intellectuals in China repositioned themselves after the collapse of the Qing in order to maintain their elite social status and to lead China into modernity.

i.      This began well before the May 4th movement, because of traditional attitudes that intellectuals were
the proper leaders of society.  Thus, informing the May 4th movement, some of the roots of that
movement were conservative rather than radical.

ii.      So, not just motivated by Westernized modernism, the May 4th ideas were “dialectically related” to
the Chinese intellectual past. (p.250)

iii.      Beida became a platform for national leadership because it was both familiar in a traditional sense,
and yet new enough that it was able to continue to evolve with the changes of the times.

iv.      The dialectic is real people acting in relation to events that overshadow the university.(251-2)